
ARMY STUDY

60 C **O** 9

REPORT OF THE M16 RIFLE REVIEW PANEL





The Army Library (ANR/L-R) ATTN: Army Studies Section Room 1A534, Pentagon Washington, D. C. 20010

OTIC FILE COPY This document has


Classified by_ EXEMPT FROM GENERAL PECTACOLICATION SCHEDINE OF EVECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY____ DECLASSIFY ON.

JUNE 1968

Interpretation is unlimited. M16 SURVEYS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

> 84 03 234





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION WASHINGTON, DC 2010

ATTENTION OF

DAMA-WSW

1 FEB mas

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Declassification Action - Report of the M16 Rifle Review Panel (6) dated 1 June 1968.

- 1. The Report on the M16 Rifle Review Panel dated 1 June 1968 was prepared for the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, by the Office of the Director of Weapons System Analysis. The Ground Combat Systems Division, Office of the Director of Weapons Systems, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition, is the successor to the originator of the report.
- 2. This office has completed a review of subject report and appendices I through II and has determined classification of Confidential is no longer needed. The report is now Unclassified. Selected extracts of the report are at Enclosure 1.
- 3. Notification of this declassification will be forwarded to all distribution addressees and a declassified copy will be forwarded to the Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, for file.

1 Encl

85

PILEZANO -COOMERC

Colonel, GS

Chief, Ground Combat Systems

Division




Appendix 7 M16 SURVEYS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1 June 1968



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED



Appendix 7

${\tt M16}$ Surveys in the Republic of Vietnam

Table of Contents

		Page
Α.	Introduction	7-1
В.	U.S. Army Weapons Command Surveys	7-2
C.	Congressional Survey	7-8
D.	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Survey	7-11
E.	Office of the Chief of Staff Survey	7-17
F.	Analysis and Conclusions	7-24
G.	Bibliography	7-30
Inc	losures	
	7-1 M16 Rifle Survey in the Republic of Vietnam	7-32



A1
UNANNOUNCED

Appendix 7

M16 SURVEYS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

A. Introduction

An urgent need for increased firepower in Vietnam was recognized by the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, when he asked for 170,000 M16 rifles in December 1965. The request was immediately approved and large numbers of M16's were introduced rapidly into Vietnam in early 1966.

No serious problems with the M16 were reported for several months, but in the fall of 1966 excessive stoppages and malfunctions began to be reported by units in U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV). A preliminary investigation made by the Customer Assistance Office of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC), and technicians from the 1st Logistical Command and USARV determined that a lack of proper training and maintenance was the probable cause of the trouble. 2/USARV then took steps to improve the quality of M16 maintenance. Among these, USARV requested in early October 1966 that U.S. Army Weapons Command (USAWECOM) furnish technical training teams.

As reliability problems with the M16 continued to be reported, military concern increased and both public and Congressional interest was aroused. This concern and interest brought about a series of field surveys by various agencies and commands.

CONFIDENTIAL

Hq MACV Msg 42787, 060148Z Dec 65.

² Hq MACV Msg MACJ42-MS 46816, 230911Z Oct 66.

B. U.S. Army Weapons Command Surveys

On 11 October 1966 USARV requested technical assistance in support of the M16 from U.S. Army Weapons Command, $\frac{3}{}$ and three surveys were made: one from October 1965 to December 1966, another in January - February 1967, and the third in April - May 1967.

October - December 1966

The first USAWECOM survey team stayed in Vietnam from 21 October 1965 until 2 December 1966.4/ While the primary purpose of the team was to provide maintenance instruction to a nucleus of officers and men from each brigade, who would then teach their own units, direct support organizations were also instructed.

The team taught maintenance in every major USARV unit except the 1st Air Cavalry Division. 6/ Students brought their own weapons, magazines, ammunition, cleaning materials, and accessories to class. A detailed inspection of each student's equipment revealed that with the exception of the weapons of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 5th Special Forces, all

Hq USARV Msg AVHGD-MD 29518, 110206Z, Oct 66.

⁴ Ltr, PM-RS, USAMC, 15 Dec 66, Subj: Liaison Visit to SEA in Reference to the XM16E1 Rifle. All information about this USAWECOM survey is from this 15 Dec 66 report unless otherwise indicated.

⁵ The team, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Herbert P. Underwood of the Office of Project Manager, Rifles, had seven other members, four from USAWECOM and three from Colt's Firearms Division of Colt Industries.

⁶ The 1st Air Cavalry Division had stated that it was having no trouble with the rifle, and asked that instruction be given only to the small arms shop of its maintenance battalion.

the weapons were poorly maintained. The most common faults observed were:

Excessive oil on the weapon;

Carbon buildup in the chamber, bolt, and bolt carrier group;

Overloading of magazines with 21 rounds of ammunition;

Oil and grit inside magazines (frequently accompanied by lubricated ammunition); and

Failure to replace worn or broken extractors and extractor springs.

Other deficiencies noted frequently were shortages of technical manuals, cleaning equipment, and repair parts, and a general lack of knowledge of the M16 rifle among officers and noncommissioned officers.

The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 5th Special Forces were the only units surveyed that had received training with the M16 for a significant period of time prior to deployment to Vietnam. Men in other units had been given training in marksmanship but little or no instruction in care and cleaning of the rifle.

The survey team verified the existence of a malfunction problem and supported the findings of the preliminary investigation by concluding that the malfunctions were primarily due to inadequate cleaning, improper lubrication, and the continued use of worn parts. The team believed, further, that poor rifle maintenance was itself

the result of insufficient maintenance training; a shortage of technical manuals, repair parts, and cleaning equipment; and a lack of knowledge-able officers and noncommissioned officers. As a result of the technical team's visit the following actions were taken within USARV:

Instruction material on the care and cleaning of the M16 was published and distributed at company or rifleman level. 7/

Emphasis was placed on the need for adequate command supervision of maintenance programs. $\frac{8}{}$

New troops were required to receive a minimum of two hours M16 maintenance training during their first week in Vietnam.

Immediate USARV inspection and repair of all M16's on hand by divisional direct support maintenance teams and elements of the 1st Logistical Command was directed.

Follow-up inspections by teams from the 1st Logistical Command were directed to check on the effectiveness of maintenance training within USARV.

USAWECOM Ltr, 25 Oct 66. User Care of the M16; USARV Combat Lessons Learned, 28 Oct 66, M16 Care and Cleaning; USARV Training Circular 5, 20 Nov 66; USARV Pamphlet 750-5, 14 Dec 66; and extracts from several PS Magazines.

⁸ COMUSMACV Msg, MACJ42-MS 46816, 230911Z Oct 66; USARV Msg AVHGD-MD 30677, 181215Z Oct 66.

January - February 1967

A follow-up of the first survey and instruction visit was made by USAWECOM from 17 January through 20 February 1967. $\frac{9}{}$ No trip report, after action report, or other memoranda exist, and therefore no comment on this survey can be made.

April - May 1967

On 17 April 1967, Headquarters, USARV, requested technical assistance with the XM148 grenade launcher. 10/ A technical team was sent in response to this request. 11/ The primary purpose of the survey was to evaluate and correct problems with the XM148 grenade launcher, but the team also examined large numbers of M16 rifles in the hands of troops to determine the status of maintenance, the availability of cleaning materials, and the condition of rifle barrels and chambers. 12/ The team was in Vietnam

HOR SOME STANDING OF THE STANDING ASSESTING ASSESTING OF THE SECTION OF THE SECTI

Podurgal, who was from the Office of the Project Manager, Rifles, two representatives from USAWECOM, one from U.S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC), and one from Colt's Firearms Division.

¹⁰ Ltr, PM-RS, USAMC, 25 May 67, p.1.

This team consisted of its chief, Major Podurgal, from the Office of the Project Manager, Rifles, Mr. Wesley B. Eastis from USAWECOM, and Mr. Kanamitsu Ito, Colt's Firearms Division

¹² Ltr, PM-RS, USAMC, 25 May 67, Subj: After Action Report - AMCPM-RS Team Visit to Vietnam, All information regarding this survey is from this report.

from 27 April through 18 May 1967, and during this time visited the two Marine divisions and every Army division and separate brigade (with the exception of Task Force Orgeon), observing rifles, checking maintenance shops, and conducting interviews.

M16 rifles were inspected by the survey team in troop units and maintenance repair shops throughout Vietnam. The findings of this survey were:

No major difficulties were being experienced with the M16.

There was still a problem with the extractor, but the frequency of malfunction had been reduced through improved care and cleaning.

Men expressed satisfaction with the M16 and agreed that it was superior to the M14 in the Vietnam environment.

About 50 percent of the M16's inspected in maintenance shops showed signs of chamber deterioration due to pitting. $\frac{14}{}$

Accumulation of thick deposits of copper fouling in rifle bores was often observed. This condition was worse in units which habitually fired a large volume of tracer ammunition.

 $^{^{13}}$ Why Task Force Oregon was not visited is unknown.

¹⁴ These weapons, which had been turned in for repair, however, may not be generally representative of those in the hands of troops.

The survey team concluded that the major problem was deterioration of rifle barrels caused by chamber pitting and the accumulation of copper fouling. It estimated that approximately 10 percent of the M16's in Vietnam would require a barrel replacement every three months. To reduce the rate of barrel deterioration, the team recommended speeding up deliveries of the recently adopted improved lubricant (MIL-L-46000A) LSA and chrome plating the rifle chambers.

C. Congressional Survey

On 3 May 1967, the House Committee on Armed Services appointed a special subcommittee to inquire into the M16 rifle program, naming Congressman Richard H. Ichord chairman and Congressmen Speedy O. Long and William G. Bray members. During their investigation the members of the subcommittee, accompanied by three special assistants and one military escort, visited Vietnam from 3 to 10 June 1967. After briefings at both Headquarters, MACV, and Headquarters, USARV, they visited the two Marine divisions and elements of five Army divisions. While in the field, they interviewed commanders, logistic support and training personnel, and soldiers and marines who had used the M16 in combat. Although some documents pertinent to the rifle program were collected, most of the information obtained by this survey came from personal interviews with men in combat units who were armed with the M16. Each of the three congressmen and three special assistants participated, and while no accurate count of the actual number of men interviewed is available, one of the special assistants, Colonel Edward B. Crossman (Ret.), estimated that he personally talked to more than 300 men.

No official report on this survey was published; the findings which follow are based upon observations by Colonel Crossman and the team escort, Colonel Paul B. Henley!5/

¹⁵ Ltr, Col Crossman (Ret) to Mr Ichord , 16 Jun 67, Subj: Report of Investigations of the M16A1 Rifle in Combat.
Memo, USARV for CINCUSARPAC and DA, 15 Jun 6/, Report of Congressional Visit (RCS SAOSA-9)
7-8

At least 50 percent of the men interviewed had encountered serious malfunctions with the M16, most of them failures to extract.

The bolt closure device was used frequently enough to justify the Army's insistance upon this product improvement.

Extractors and extractor springs required replacement fairly often.

While there was no general shortage of cleaning and preserving equipment, many individuals were short of the critical cleaning rod and chamber brush.

Approximately 50 percent of the men preferred the M14. Most of the men who wanted the M14 felt that it was a more reliable rifle and were concerned about the M16's possible malfunctions in combat.

The M16's light weight, full-automatic fire capability, handiness, ease of firing, and light ammunition weight were all factors mentioned in its favor.

A large percentage of the men appeared to be shooting their rifles in combat, in marked contrast to experience in Korea.

Many cases of a stuck or jammed selector lever were reported.

It was not possible to correlate kind of lubricant or method of lubrication with malfunctions, nor was such correlation possible

with ammunition of a particular type or make.

Colonel Crossman recommended in his letter to Mr Ichord that an immediate investigation be conducted of ammunition design and manufacture, rifle design and manufacture, and maintenance in the field to determine the cause and cure for failures to extract. He also recommended modification of the selector lever and related parts to eliminate any tendency to stick.

7-10

CONFIDENTIAL

D. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Survey

The Directorate for Inspection Services (DINS), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), conducted a field survey in Vietnam from 22 August to 6 September 1967 to examine the performance of the M16 rifle. 16' Findings were to be compared with a technical evaluation of the M16 already completed by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, who would then submit to the Deputy Secretary of Defense a final report stating whether any major deficiencies existed in the weapons and recommending corrective action accordingly.

Emphasis was placed on identifying corrective actions taken or required to improve the basic weapon and its accessories, the maintenance and logistic support thereof, and individual M16 rifle training (CONUS and SVN). The effectiveness of supervision of the chain of command was examined with respect to implementing corrective actions down to the individual rifleman. The performance and acceptability of the M16 was examined under a variety of combat conditions, terrain and weather. Special interest examinations were made with respect to additional field testing of the weapon in SVN, reporting procedures for performance data, and the effects of varying operating tactics (modes of fire) on reliability. Finally, suggestions for additional improvements to the rifle and accessories were solicited. 17/

The survey team questionnaire was completed by 1,585 men armed with the M16. The following is a summary of responses to the questionnaire: $\frac{18}{}$

^{· 16} This team of six officers was headed by Major General Robert W. Strong, USAF.

Directorate for Inspection Services, OASD (Administration), 30 Sep 67, M16 Rifle Survey in South Vietnam, p.1.

¹⁸ Directorate for Inspection Services, OASD (Administration), undated, M16 Rifle Survey in South Vietnam, pp 17-18. (DINS, OASD (Administration) published two reports, the first undated and the subsequent one dated 30 Sep 67).

		Yes	<u>No</u>	unknown n/a
1.	Have you used the M16 rifle in combat operations?	83%	17%	
2.	Has the M16 rifle performed well for you in Vietnam?	85%	13%	2%
3.	Do you like the M16 as an individual weapon?	87%	12%	1%
4.	Do you clean your M16 daily?	71%	28%	1%
5.	Did you receive training on firing the M16 rifle after arrival in Vietnam?	82%	17%	1%
6.	Did you zero your individual weapon in Vietnam?	77%	20%	3%
7.	Have you had stoppage(s) with your rifle during firing? $\frac{19}{}$			
8.	Were you able to clear the stoppage and continue to fire?	72%	8%	20%
9.	Do you carry a cleaning kit for your M16 rifle?	69%	29%	2%
10.	Are you able to get cleaning material for your rifle in your unit?	82%	16%	2%
11.	Have you received special train- ing in the maintenance of the M16 rifle under field conditions?	65%	32%	3%
12.	Does your unit have a daily weapons inspection by the chain of command?	44%	53%	3%

 $[\]frac{19}{N}$ None, 17 percent; few, 70 percent; many (more than ten), 10 percent; and no answer, 3 percent.

		Yes	<u>No</u>	unknown n/a
13.	Have you received the new lubricant for the M16 rifle?	54%	44%	2%
14.	Has the new lubricant improved the performance of your M16? (If you have used it)	66%		34%
15.	Have you been told to keep your ammunition clean?	96%	4%	
16.	Do you clean your ammunition and magazines daily?	29%	69%	2%
17.	Would it help to have all maga- zines preloaded in disposable sealed magazines?	86%	11%	3%
18.	Do you usually load 20 rounds in your magazines?	16%	83%	1%
19.	If you usually load less than 20 rounds, how many do you load? 20/		•	
20.	Have you used the BOLT ASSIST to reduce stoppage?	44%	42%	14%
21.	In combat have you usually fired the M16 fully automatic?	38%	51%	11%

The following OSD field survey findings were based upon a synthesis of the data collected from the questionnaire and from more than 600 personal interviews with commanders, maintenance personnel, and riflemen: 21/

^{20/20} rounds, 16 percent; 19 rounds, 10 percent; 18 rounds, 67 percent; 17 rounds, 6 percent; and 15 rounds, 1 percent.

²¹ Directorate for Inspection Services, OASD (Administration), 30 Sep 67, M16 Rifle Field Survey Vietnam, pp. 13-15.

Training

- 1. In general, adequate training policy, guidance, and directives have been published by the separate services and their subordinate commands in CONUS to remedy the reported deficiencies contributing to M16 malfunctions in South Vietnam.
- 2. Training in CONUS could be improved by additional emphasis on familiarization firing, use of improved cleaning techniques, rifle disassembly and assembly, and application of procedures to reduce stoppages (immediate action).
- 3. The functions of rifle inspection and maintenance thereof in the field would be improved by increased CONUS training of company grade officers and noncommissioned officers in the nomenclature, functioning, care, and cleaning of the M16.
- 4. Adequate policy, guidance, and directives have been published by MACV and major subordinate headquarters prescribing specific training in the familiarization, care, cleaning, maintenance, and zero firing of the M16 rifle. These directives are available at all echelons of command in South Vietnam as a basis for effective training programs for individual combat riflemen.
- 5. The interview of individual riflemen in South Vietnam disclosed that compliance with MACV training directives had not been achieved to the desired degree. This was caused by some failure to communicate to the operating units, down to the individual rifleman, the training directives issued by MACV and major subordinate commands. There was also some failure in the chain of command to follow up the implementation of the directives in order to achieve compliance.

Support

6. CONUS support of the M16 rifle was found to be adequate in every respect and improving. Adequate quantities of repair parts, cleaning materials, and equipment were available or in supply channels to meet all requirements.

- 7. MACV has directed appropriate action to insure the availability to operational units of adequate supplies, repair parts, and cleaning equipment. However, the individual rifleman has not consistently received these items on a routine basis even though available at direct support echelons.
- 8. The principal direct cause of the stoppages of the M16 rifle in South Vietnam has been the failure to extract the spent case. In turn this is caused by dirty or corroded cartridges, and improperly maintained chambers.

on the contraction of the contraction of

- 9. Adequate regularly conducted inspections of the M16 rifle were not being accomplished in many units. In the majority of units the inspection of magazines and ammunition on a regular basis was rarely accomplished.
- 10. Almost one hundred percent issue of the new LSA lubricant had just been completed to combat units at the time of the field survey. More than one half of those surveyed had used it in the field; and these reported improvement over previous lubricants. Noteworthy is the report of its rust and water repellant characteristics when used by units deployed in wet and muddy terrain.
- 11. Out of millions of rounds of 5.56mm ammunition expended, very few ammunition malfunctions were reported. Where rifles were given proper care, individual riflemen were unable to discern any difference in performance or carbon build-up between ammunition loaded with either ball or IMR propellant from different manufacturers.
- 12. The new buffer for the M16 had been issued to all maneuver elements. Action had been taken to accomplish retrofit and had been completed in the majority of these elements. Issue to all other units had been programmed and was in progress with scheduled completion during December 1967. In those units in which retrofit had been completed, riflemen surveyed reported that it had improved overall performance of cheir weapon.
- 13. No determination could be made of the effect or the impact on the performance of the M16 rifle by the

substitution of the chrome chambered barrel due to the small number of rifles in Vietnam so modified. Soonest determination could be made of the effect of this modification if it is issued on a priority basis to all U.S. maneuver units in South Vietnam.

Current Problems

14. There are no major problems being experienced in the field with the M16 rifle at this time that have not been identified and for which corrective action had not been instituted. There are minor problems remaining which are within the purview of the product improvement program for the weapon.

Performance and Acceptability

- 15. The over-all performance of the M16 rifle in Vietnam has had the revolutionary impact of dramatic improvement of the combat capability of U.S. ground maneuver units in all types of operations. This is in spite of reliability problems caused by its accelerated issue and employment on a large scale, and the less than adequate preparation, training and discipline of U.S. forces for its support and maintenance.
- 16. The general performance of the M16 rifle had been satisfactory in Vietnam. Since June 1967, it has improved steadily as a result of increased training and discipline of the rifleman in the care, cleaning and maintenance of the weapon.
- 17. The great preponderance of riflemen, their commanders and support personnel accept the M16 as the proper infantry rifle for use throughout Vietnam and like it as an individual weapon. Only thirty-eight individuals out of the more than 2,100 surveyed stated they would exchange their M16 rifle for another weapon. Of this group, thirty-five wanted the shorter, lighter version of the M16--the CAR-15 (XM177).

E. Office of the Chief of Staff Survey

Early in November of 1967, the Chief of Staff directed a review of the entire M16 rifle program. 27/ On 8 November the M16 Rifle Review Panel was convened within the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and instructed to prepare a comprehensive history and evaluation of the M16 program, recommending further action as required. This panel then conducted a field survey of men armed with the M16 in Vietnam during the period 24 January through 5 February 1968 to collect data on the reliability, status of training, status of maintenance, and general overall effectiveness of the M16-M16Al rifle system. 23/ Specific objectives of the field survey were to:

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

- 1. Determine the extent of corrective action previously taken to improve the reliability of the M16 rifle system.
- Identify current problems experienced with the M16 in the field.
- 3. Evaluate the general performance and acceptability of the system under combat conditions.

All major Army units and one Marine division were surveyed.

The survey team used two means of collecting data: personal interviews and a questionnaire. The interviews were with men whose

²² CSM 67-436, 8 Nov 67, Subj: The M16 Rifle Program.

This team of six was headed by Mr John A. Locherd from the Weapon Systems Analysis Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army.

primary duties involved either rifle training or the logistical support of the rifle system, and with members of the chain of command within tactical units. The questionnaire was completed by 2,021 men armed with the M16.

The findings of the survey are summarized below. (For detailed discussion see Inclosure 7-1.)

Training.

1. A total of 23 percent of all men questioned who came direct from the continental United States indicated that they had received no formal M16 training prior to their arrival in Vietnam. Of the men from all other theaters, 73 percent stated they had not received such training before arrival.

- 2. Although 24 percent of the men indicated they had not received any M16 rifle training before arrival in Vietnam, there is good reason to believe that this problem will be reduced significantly in the near future. Analysis of survey data reveals a pronounced trend toward reduction of the numbers of men slipping through without M16 training. Only 4 percent of the men deploying during October 1967 January 1968, indicated they were untrained.
- 3. Adequate training policies, guidance, and directives have been published by Headquarters, MACV, and Headquarters, USARV. These directives were not consistently available among units conducting replacement training at the time of the survey.
- 4. M16 training observed at divisional replacement centers did not always comply with MACV or USARV training directives.

7-18

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5. USARV M16 training policies and procedures did not distinguish among replacements by theater source or by the amount of rifle training men had received before their arrival in Vietnam.
- 6. 28 percent of the men surveyed said they had not received formal M16 rifle training in Vietnam. The number of men who had received M16 training in Vietnam varied appreciably from one major unit to another.
- 7. Many unit armorers lacked formal training and adequate knowledge of M16 rifle maintenance. As a result of this failing, rifles that properly should have been repaired by the unit armorer (those with a broken extractor, for example) had to be turned in by the riflemen and repaired at a higher echelon. Other unit armorer duties, such as periodic lubrication of detent springs, were often neglected.

FOR THE FERENCE FOR THE SECONDARY WATHING THE PRINCE FOR THE THE THE TREE FOR THE T

Maintenance and Supply

- 8. Adequate quantities of repair parts and cleaning materials and equipment were found to be generally available in Vietnam. However, unbalanced distribution among depots occasionally resulted in temporary shortages which did affect using units.
- 9. Cleaning materials such as the cleaning rod, lubricant, brushes, and patches, were generally available to the rifleman and he usually carried most items with him in the field. Pipe cleaners and bore cleaners, however, were often not available.

7-19

COMFIGURAL

- 10. Men tended to clean their rifles two to three times more frequently than they cleaned their magazines and ammunition. This tendency was incouraged by unit maintenance inspections, which stressed care of the rifle and failed to emphasize the importance of properly maintained magazines and ammunition.
- 11. Unit armorers frequently did not accompany units into the field, and as a consequence field repair of weapons was neglected.
- 12. The buffer retrofit program was not complete at the time of the survey, although units within USARV had reported 100 percent completion of this program during November 1967. 84 percent of those surveyed indicated they had new buffers.

Reliability and Acceptability

- 13. Failures to extract still occurred with enough frequency to reduce confidence in the M16. Among the men surveyed, 35 percent had experienced at least one such failure within the previous four months. The average number of reported failures to extract was 4.8 per man reporting this type malfunction.
- 14. Attempts to establish a statistically significant correlation between failures to extract and such possible causes as poor cleaning habits, overlubrication, and the user's lack of mechanical training were unsuccessful. Inability to statistically isolate the causitive factors from field survey data suggests that failures to extract are not caused exclusively by user abuse.

- 15. Among those surveyed, 42 percent indicated that they had experienced at least one failure to lock. Of those reporting this type failure, the average number of failures was 5.3.
- 16. Half of the men reported having used the bolt assist and 69 percent indicated that use of the bolt assist had cleared the malfunction.

- 17. When asked what weapon they would prefer to carry in combat, 85 percent of the men wanted either the M16 or its submachine gun version, the XM177.
- 18. In general, men armed with the M16 in Vietnam rated this rifle's performance high. Most frequently lauded were its light weight and its firepower. However, many men entertained some misgivings about the M16's reliability (33 percent made adverse comments on either the rifle's sensitivity or its reliability).

Product Improvements

- 19. Although the chrome plated chamber has not been fielded long enough to permit adequate evaluation, many men who had recently received an M16 with a chrome chamber found the rifle significantly more reliable than earlier models they had used.
- 20. The desire for magazines of greater capacity than 20 rounds was frequently expressed.
- 21. On-weapon storage capacity for cleaning materials is required. At the time of the survey, there was no means satisfactory to the rifleman for carrying these materials.

7-21

General Usage

- 22. '83 percent of all men surveyed indicated they did test fire. The manner and frequency of test firing varied appreciably among units. A greater percentage of leaders, from fire team to platoon level, test fired than men within the rifle squads.
- 23. Within the theater, 10 percent of the men armed with the M16 had never zeroed their rifles. About one-fourth of the men zeroed when their weapons were issued at the beginning of their tours and never thereafter, while about half zeroed quarterly.

 USARV quarterly training requirements included zeroing of rifler.

- 24. Ammunition loads carried by the men were generally excessive, although the loads varied greatly. Individual loads ranged from 7 to over 40 magazines. In terms of actual useage, the average individual ammunition load carried was from 39 to 41 normal consumption days of ammunition.
- 25. Most men loaded 18 rounds in their magazines; the theater average was 18.3 rounds.
- 26. The theater consumption ratio of ball to tracer ammunition for men armed with the Mi6 was 4:1. This ratio varied appreciably among units (unit averages were a product of even wider differences among individuals, with many men firing 100 percent tracer).

27. Men estimated that they used the automatic mode of fire about 34 percent of the time and that about 60 percent of their automatic fire was expended in short bursts.

F. Analysis and Conclusions

In response to General William C. Westmoreland's request of December 1965, the M16 was fielded in Vietnam as rapidly as the rifles became available. The transition from the M14 to the M16 was accomplished so swiftly that most of the Army's combat forces were equipped with the M16 after they arrived in Vietnam, or so shortly before they left the United States that formal M16 training prior to departure was limited. This accelerated introduction of the M16 into Vietnam, along with shortages of cleaning materials and repair parts, and generally inadequate knowledge of the weapon on the part of the chain of command led to poor maintenance in the early stages of the rifle's use in Vietnam.

In the fall of 1966 excessive malfunctions 24/ were reported. The first surveys concluded that insufficient training of men in the care and maintenance of the M16 was the basic cause of the high malfunction rate, and a training program designed to increase care and cleaning proficiency was immediately begun. Subsequent surveys found M16 maintenance significantly improved and the malfunction problem reduced.

Despite improved care, malfunctions continued to occur with enough frequency to warrant concern. The Congressional survey in June 1967 found user acceptability relatively low. At that time

Primarily failure to extract the spent cartridge.

about one-half of the riflemen wished to exchange their M16's for M14's, chiefly because they had misgivings about the M16's reliability. This attitude toward the M16 was not entirely the product of a bad press, or rumors, since many men indicated that they had personally experienced one or more failures to extract while they were using the rifle in combat.

In the fall of 1967 the Office of the Secretary of Defense field survey found acceptability unusually high. $\frac{25}{}$ "The M16 has achieved wide acceptance throughout Vietnam. Only 38 individuals of all those surveyed (2,100) would like to exchange their M16 for another weapon. Of this group 35 wanted the shorter, lighter version of the M16 -- the CAR15." (XM177) This acceptability figure is misleading since the OSD survey questionnaire did not ask the men which weapon they preferred. $\frac{26}{}$ A better picture can be gained from responses to the OSD question: Do you like the M16? 12 percent of the men answered, "No."

Findings of the 1968 survey conducted by the Office of the Chief of Staff are basically consistent with the other surveys.

These earlier surveys stressed the urgent need for improved care of the M16 by the rifleman. Emphasis upon maintenance has reduced the number of M16 malfunctions but has not eliminated the reliability

²⁵ Directorate of Inspection Services, OASD(A), 30 Sep 67, M16 Rifle Field Survey in South Vietnam, p.15.

Men could write in comments on weapon preference but were not required to do so.

problem. It is clear that emphasis should be shifted to an examination of the entire rifle and ammunition system.

The following detailed conclusions are based upon the most recent Vietnam survey, the January-February 1968 visit of the M16 Rifle Review Panel.

Policies and directives throughout Vietnam which govern M16 training, supply, maintenance, and user care and cleaning were found generally adequate in January-February 1968. Continued command supervision is required to improve compliance with these directives.

With the exception of Vietnam-oriented advanced individual training for infantrymen, all M16 training given to men before Their deployment to Vietnam should be improved. Many leaders have been hampered in meeting their supervisory responsibilities by insufficient knowledge of the M16. Frequently, riflemen receive either poor M16 training or none before they arrive in Vietnam. 27/In order to improve predeployment rifle training the following measure should be taken:

- 1. Accelerate introduction of M16 rifles and M16 training for all men in basic combat training at the earliest possible date.
- 2. Increase the amount of M16 instruction for supervisors in all schools producing junior leaders, for example, NCO refresher courses, officer candidate schools, and basic branch courses.

Recently improved clearance procedures within the continental United States have reduced the numbers of men who deploy without rifle training.

3. Establish procedures to insure receipt of M16 training for men on intertheater transfer to Vietnam.

USARV requires all replacements to complete the same M16 training program. Since many untrained replacements have arrived in Vietnam, it is appropriate that two training programs be operated: the present one for most men and another and more intensive one for the totally untrained.

Unit armorers often lacked formal training and adequate knowledge of M16 rifle maintenance. Provision should therefore be made for additional training for armorers, perhaps through divisional schools or mobile training teams from the 1st Logistical Command.

Men tend to clean their rifles two to three times more frequently than they clean their magazines, yet corroded or dirty ammunition and defective magazines seriously reduce rifle effectiveness. Unit maintenance inspections should emphasize care of the entire rifle system.

Adequate quantities of repair parts and cleaning materials and equipment were found to be generally available in Vietnam. However, unbalanced distribution among depots has occasionally resulted in temporary shortages which have affected rifle maintenance. The causes for this maldistribution should be identified and then procedures to achieve optimum distribution instituted.

COMPREHIMAL

Although individuals usually test fired their rifles, the nature and frequency of such firing varies widely among and within units. Test firing, when properly performed, will increase weapon reliability, and significant improvement in rifle effectiveness will be achieved by:

1. Isolation of defective rifles and magazines through periodic test firing by individuals in a combat zone. The Project Manager, Rifles, should develop a standard test firing procedure for this purpose.

unsky mengelikanishing dan dan mengelikan mengelikan mengelikan mengelikan mengelikan mengelikan mengelikan me

Continued command emphasis upon the importance of frequent and properly conducted test firing.

Greater zeroing effort is required, particularly within maneuver battalions. The average frequency of zeroing was every 4.96 months and 10 percent of the men had never zeroed their rifles. Zeroing increases both hit probability and user confidence in the rifle. It also stimulates the appropriate use of aimed fire. Verification of zero should be integrated with test firing, since any object that can visibly register hits may serve as a target.

Current performance and acceptability data indicate:

- 1. The M16's high rate of lethal fire and light weight are qualities particularly suitable for the war in Vietnam.
- 2. Failures to extract still occur with enough frequency to reduce confidence in the M16, and these failures have several

causes. Besides inadequate maintenance, such failures may result from pitted chambers, from defective parts, or from faulty control of ammunition case hardness. Consequently, both continued product improvement and user effort are necessary elements within any program to reduce the M16 reliability problem.

- 3. Introduction of the chromed chamber appears to have reduced the number of failures to extract, but this improvement has not been fielded long enough to permit adequate evaluation.
- 4. Most men armed with the M16 in Vietnam rated this rifle's performance high; however, many men entertained some misgivings about the M16's reliability. When asked which weapon they preferred to carry in combat, 85 percent of the men indicated that they wanted either the M16 or its submachine gun version, the XM177.
- 5. A field malfunction reporting system should be established throughout USARV. While such a system does not produce reliability data with laboratory precision, it does permit analysis of malfunction trends and would contribute to further improvement in the reliability of the M16.

The M14 was preferred by 15 percent, while less than one percent wished to carry either the Stoner rifle, the AK-47, the carbine, or a pistol.

G. Bibliography

Headquarters, MACV Message 42787, 060148Z December 1965.

Headquarters, USARV Message AVHGD-MD 29518, i10206Z October 1966.

Headquarters, USARV, Message AVHGD-MD 30677, 181215Z October 1966.

Headquarters, MACV Message MACJ42-MS 46816, 230911Z October 1966.

USAWECOM Letter, 25 October 1966, User Care of the M16.

USARV Combat Lessons Learned, 28 October 1966, M16 Care and Cleaning.

USARV Training Circular 5, 20 November 1966.

USARV Pamphlet 750-5, 14 December 1966, The XM16El Rifle.

Letter, Project Manager, Rifles, U.S. Army Materiel Command, 15 December 1966, Liaison Visit to SEA in Reference to the XM16El Rifle.

Letter, Project Manager, Rifles, U.S. Army Materiel Command, 25 May 1967, After Action Report - AMCPM-RS Team Visit to Vietnam.

Headquarters, USARV Memorandum for Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, and Department of the Army, 15 June 1967, Report of Congressional Visit (RCS SAOSA-9), with Tabs A through L.

Letter, Colonel Edward B. Crossman (Ret.) to Mr. Richard H. Ichord, 16 June 1967, Report of Investigation of the M16Al Rifle in Combat.

Report, Directorate for Inspection Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), undated, M16 Rifle Field Survey in South Vietnam.

Report, Directorate for Inspection Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), 30 September 1967, M16 Rifle Field Survey in South Vietnam.

Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 18 October 1967, Evaluation and Survey of the M16 Rifle, with two attachments.

ATOMINATION POLICION POLICION POLICION PER PROPERTIES AND POLICION POLICION

M!6 RIFLE SURVEY
IN THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
24 JANUARY - 5 FEBRUARY 1968

3 MAY 1968

PREPARED BY:

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

OFFICE DIRECTOR OF WEAPON SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

CONFIDENTIAL'

Inclosure 7-1

M16 RIFLE SURVEY

IN THE

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

THE PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO ADDRESSEES. REPRODUCTION OF THIS REPORT IN WHOLE IS PROHIBITED. RECIPIENTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO EXTRACT AND REPRODUCE, AS NECESSARY, THOSE PORTIONS OF THE REPORT WHICH ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

DISTRIBUTION

SA	1	CG USCONARC	2
USofA	1	CG USAIS	1
GC	1	CG USACDC	2
CofSA	1	CG USACDCCAG	1
OAVCofSA	10	CG USACDCEC	1
DCSPER	1	CO USACDC Infantry	•
DCSOPS	1	Agency	1
DCSLOG	1	CG USAMC	2
ACSFOR	1	CG USAWECOM	1
CRD	1	PM Rifles	2
CLL	1	CG USAMUCOM	1
COMUSMACV	1	CG USATECOM	1
•	_	President USAIB	1
CG USARV	3		_
CINCUSARPAC	1		41

M16 Rifle Survey in the Republic of Vietnam

Table of Contents

Secti	on	Page
·ı.	Abstract	1
II.	Purpose	2
III.	Survey Procedures	3
IV.	Questionnaire	6
v.	General Location of Units Surveyed	10
VI.	Survey Team Composition	11
VII.	Itinerary Within Vietnam (24 January - 5 February 1968)	12
VIII.	Analysis of Survey Data	13
· IX.	Conclusions	37
x.	Frequency Distributions of Responses to Questionnaire	41
XI.	Matrix Plots	88
Table	es	
1.	Cleaning Frequency and Unit Inspections by Unit	16
2.	Lubrication of Ammunition, Test Firing and Buffer Retrofit by Unit	17
3.	Ammunition Consumption and M16 Training in Vietnam by Unit	18
4.	Zeroing History by Unit	19
5.	Failure to Extract by Unit	20

AND HIGH TO THE PARTICULAR OF THE CONTROL OF THE CO

		Page
6.	M16 Training BEFORE Vietnam by Theater Source	24
7.	Theater Source by MOS for those without M16 Training BEFORE Vietnam	24
8.	Theater Source by Duty Position for those without M16 Training BEFORE Vietnam	25
9.	Theater Source by Grade for those without M16 Training BEFORE Vietnam	25
10.	Receipt of M16 Training BEFORE Vietnam by Deployment Month	26
11.	Test Firing by Duty Position	33
12.	Test Firing by Type Unit	33
13.	Zeroing History by Duty Position	34
14.	Zeroing History by Type Unit	34
15.	Zeroing History for those having Twelve Months in Vietnam	35
16.	Ammunition Load by Type Unit	36

INTERNATION OF THE PROPERTY OF

I. Abstract

A field survey of men armed with the M16 rifle was conducted in Vietnam from 28 January through 5 February 1968 as a part of a review of the M16 program presently under preparation within the Office of the Chief of Staff. This report is an extract from that review.

The purpose of the survey was to evaluate measures already taken to improve M16 reliability, to identify current rifle problems, and to determine the general performance and acceptability of the system under combat conditions. All major Army units in USAAV and one marine division were included in the survey sample. Two means were used to collect data: personal interviews and a questionnaire.

Torbed Michigaria Cord Presented at the second and second and second and second and second and second second and second as a sec

The survey indicated that the M16 rifle system was suitable for the war in Vietnam. Particularly desirable qualities were its high rate of lethal fire and light weight. However, failures to extract were still occurring with enough frequency to undermine confidence in the M16. Although men generally preferred to carry this weapon in combat, some misgivings were entertained about its reliability. Introduction of the chromed chamber appeared to reduce the number of failures to extract, but this improvement had not been fielded long enough to permit adequate evaluation. Many factors cause failures to extract, and continued product improvement and user effort are required to improve reliability.

II. Purpose and Scope

Early in November of 1967, the Chief of Staff directed an intensive review of the entire M16 rifle program. On 8 November 1967 the M16 Rifle Review Panel was convened within the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and instructed to prepare a comprehensive history and evaluation of the M16 program, recommending further action as required. This panel then conducted a field survey of men armed with the M16 in Vietnam during the period 24 January through 5 February 1968 to collect data on the reliability, status of training, status of maintenance, and general overall effectiveness of the M16-M16A1 rifle system. The information gathered has permitted comparative evaluation with results obtained in earlier field surveys, and whatever insight has been gained from the comparison, as well as the facts collected during the survey itself, have been added to the overall history and review of the M16 rifle program.

Specific objectives of the field survey were to

- 1. Determine the extent of corrective action previously taken to improve the reliability of the M16 rifle system.
- 2. Identify current problems experienced with the M16 in the field.
- 3. Evaluate the general performance and acceptability of the system under combat conditions.

III. Survey Procedures

The panel used two means of collecting data: personal interviews and a questionnaire.

The interviews were with men whose primary duties involved either rifle training or the logistical support of the rifle system, and with members of the chain of command within tactical units.

The questionnaire (Section IV) was designed to provide insight as to the reliability of the rifle system, the training of the men who used it, and the manner in which the system has been employed and supported. It was completed only by men armed with the M16. In an attempt to avoid bias or inhibition, no one was asked to place his name on the questionnaire and each individual was urged to base his responses only upon his own experience with the rifle. The questionnaire was administered by members of the survey team and by the 22d and 90th Replacement Battalions. The answers to many of the questions have permitted direct comparison with results of the field survey conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 24 August through 5 September 1967.

The survey data is based upon responses from 2,021 men.

Since the primary user of the rifle in combat is found within the infantry battalion, these units are heavily represented in the sample. One half (51 percent) of all men surveyed were from

infantry battalions and 681 (38 percent) had an 11E military occupational specialty (light weapons infantryman).

To assure a fair representation of experience under the variety of environmental conditions found within Vietnam all major units were included in the survey. (For the location of units, see Section V.) The distribution of responses by major unit was:

Major Unit	Number of Questionnaires
lst Infantry Division	109
lst Air Cavalry Division	143
4th Infantry Division	51
9th Infantry Division	419
25th Infantry Division	80
Americal Division	285
101st Airborne Division	63
Separate Brigades (173d and 199th)	. 54
Other USARV Units	693
1st Marine Division	124
Total	2,021

Survey team members selected were those men on the Department of Army Staff who were most intimately involved with and knowledgeable of the M16 rifle system, its training program, logistical support, product improvements, and reliability problems. The team composition is listed in Section VI.

The survey team intended to content each major unit in Vietnam. The Communist TET offernive created a turbulent military situation and shortages of aircraft which reduced the number of units that could be directly contacted during the survey. A broadened survey sample was achieved by administering questionnaires at replacement battalions to individuals who were returning to the United States, having just completed their Vietnam tours.

Information of immediate command interest derived from data collected by the team was provided to the commanders concerned during exit interviews. In those instances when corrective action was appropriate, measures to relieve the situation were immediately initiated by the chain of command.

IV. Questionnaire

M16Al Rifle Field Survey, Republic of Vietnam January - February 1968

What is your unit? (Division or Separate Brigade)
Grade How many months in Vietnam
Where from if not CONUS MOS Duty Position (Sgd Ldr, Rifleman, etc.
1. Which of the following weapons have you used in combat?
a. M14; b. M16 w/o new buffer or chrome chamber
c. M16 w/new buffer only; d. M16 w/new buffer and chrome
chamber
2. Delete
3. Did you receive formal M16 training before arriving in RVN?
Yes; No Since arriving in RVN? Yes; No
4. If you received fromal M16 training, how many hours did you
receive:
Before Coming to RVN In RVN
a. Mechanical training
b. Range firing
c. Tactical live fire exercises
5. Do you have the following cleaning materials or are they
available in the unit?
Yes No Yes No a. Cleaning rod e. Patches
b. LSA lubricant f. Pipe cleaners
c. Chamber brush g. Bore cleaner
d. Bore brush
. CONFIDENTIAL

The state of the s

6. Do you normally carry any of the following with you on combat
operations?
Yes No Yes No a. Cleaning Rod e. Patches
b. LSA lubricant f. Pipe cleaners
c. Chamber brush g. Bore cleander
d. Bore brush
If so, how do you usually carry them?
7. Is your rifle equipped with: a. New buffer? Yes; No
(How long wks); b. Chrome plated chamber? Yes; Nc
(How long? wks).
8. When was the last time you zeroed your M16? wks ago.
9. How many rounds of 5.56 ammo do you normally carry on operations?
ball; tracer
10. Do you lubricate your ammo? Yes; No
11. When was the last time you received instruction on the care
and cleaning of: a. The M16 (day, month, year);
b. Its ammunition (day, month, year);
c. Its magazine (day, month, year)?
12. Have you ever experienced a failure of the bolt to lock on
the M16? Yes; No If so, how many times?
13. Have you ever used the BOLT ASSIST? Yes; No If
ves. What percent of the time did it clear the problem? %.


7

14. How many magazines do you normally carry on operations?
15. In combat, what percentage of the time do you use the full
automatic mode of fire%; semiautomatic mode of fire%.
16. When using the full automatic mode, what percentage of time
do you fire in short bursts (2-3 rounds)%; in long bursts
(10-20 rounds)%.
17. What is largest number of rounds you have fired in any one
day of combat? rounds.
18. Have you been issued a card with care and cleaning instructions
for the M16? Yes; No If so, do you still have it?
Yes; No
19. Does your unit test fire individual weapons? Yes; No
20. If the answer to 19 is yes, is a regular schedule prescribed?
Yes; No If yes, please explain the schedule
21. To the best of your recollection, how often have you cleaned
your M16?
22. How many rounds do you usually load in a magazine? rounds.
23. Approximately how many rounds have you fired with the M16
during the past four months? 0-500, 500-1000, 1000-1500,
1500-2000, more than 2000
24. During the past four months, did you experience a failure
to extract? Yes; No If yes, how many times? times.

25. Have you, during the last four months, had problems with a
round sticking in the chamber when it was left for periods of:
0-8 hours Yes, No; 9-16 hours Yes, No; 17-24
hours Yes, No
26. Does your unit have weapons inspection? Yes; No
If yes, how many times a week? Who inspects the weapons?
Fire team ldr, Sqd ldr, Plat sgt, Plat ldr, CO? (Circle one).
Does your unit inspect magazines and ammo? Yes; No
27. Approximately what percentage of the ammo that you fire in
combat is tracer?%.
28. Give to the best of your recollection, how often you cleaned
your magazines and ammo
29. Which of the following do you prefer as your individual
weapon? M16; M14; M16 Commando (XM177E1 SMG); Other
(specify).
30. What do you like about the M16?
31. What do you dislike about the M16?
32. Additional comments

Q

V. General Location of Units Surveyed (24 January - 5 February 1968)



VI. Survey Team Composition

Kihnemestri ergikergenergi ergikergi ergikergi ergikerging bilage ergikergi ergikergi ergikergi ergikergikergi

Team Chief

Mr. John A. Lockerd (GS-15)
Weapon Systems Analysis Directorate
Office Chief of Staff, Army
Headquarters, Department of the Army

U.S. Army, Pacific Project Officer

Mr. T. C. Murphy (GS-14)
G-3 Section
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Pacific

U.S. Army, Vietnam Project Officer

COL J. T. Price
M16 Project Officer
G-4 Section
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam

Team Members

LTC Neil G. Nelson
Directorate of Individual Training
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Headquarters, Department of the Army

LTC Dean F. Schnoor
Directorate of Materiel Acquisition
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Headquarters, Department of the Army

LTC John D. A. Hogan, Jr.
Directorate of Doctrine and Systems
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Headquarters, Department of the Army

LTC George H. Gardes
Directorate of Plans and Programs
Office, Chief of Research and Development
Headquarters, Department of the Army

LTC David P. Thoreson
Weapon Systems Analysis Directorate
Office Chief of Staff, Army
Headquarters, Department of the Army

VII. Itinerary Within Vietnam (24 January - 5 February 1968)

Headquarters USARV	24	January
deadquarters USARV Ast Logistical Command	25	January
9th Infantry Division	26	January
9th Infantry Division	27	January
lst Logistical Command 90th Replacement Battalion	28	January
Headquarters MACV 90th Replacement Battalion	29	January
22d Replacement Battalion Americal Division	30	January
Americal Division	31	January
Headquarters III Marine Amphibious Force	1	February
lst Marine Division 3d Marine Division	2	February
lst Marine Division 3d Marine Division	3	February
Headquarters USARV 90th Replacement Battalion	4	February
Headquarters USARV	5	February

kordoningarahingan andamparahandan arangarahan arangarahan arangarahan arangarahan arangarahan arangarahan ara

VIII. Analysis of Survey Data

General

All findings are based upon the results of personal interviews and data collected from questionnaires.

Display and analysis of questionnaire data were simplified through the use of a SUMX computor program. (Frequency distributions of each questionnaire item are contained in Section X.) The SUMX program was also used to produce a series of matrixes which relate responses to one item with those of another. (Items examined through this technique are listed in Section XI.)

Major Unit Comparisons

Cleaning frequency and unit maintenance inspection data shown in Table 1 reflect that:

- 1. Men tended to clean their rifles two to three times more frequently than they cleaned their magazines and ammunition. This tendency was encouraged through unit maintenance inspections, which also emphasized the rifle rather than the entire rifle system.
- 2. Frequency of cleaning was generally greater among units that conducted more maintenance inspections. However, other factors also influenced cleaning frequency, for example, how often the rifle was fired and the user's anticipated need for a reliably functioning rifle. Nontactical USARV units, for example, cleaned less frequently than the theater average, despite a higher than theater average

unit maintenance inspection level. The opposite behavior was observed in the Americal Division where cleaning frequency was relatively high and unit inspections infrequent.

Review of information regarding lubrication of ammunition, test firing, and the buffer retrofit program (Table 2) indicates:

1. One quarter of all men armed with the M16 lubricated their ammunition - a practice contrary to all published directives.

(During the survey over-use of LSA lubricant on the rifle and ammunition appeared to decrease as the survey team traveled northward from the Delta to the demilitarized zone. The general climate was dryer in the north.)

ndinglyd begeren by en b

- Most individuals test fired their rifles. The lowest incidence of test firing was among nondivisional USARV units and separate brigades.
- 3. The buffer retrofit program was not complete (84 percent of those surveyed indicated they had new buffers) at the time of the survey, although units within USARV had reported 100 percent completion of this program during November 1967.

The following conclusions have been drawn from ammunition consumption data and M16 training information:

1. The theater ratio of ball to tracer ammunition for men armed with the M16 was 4:1. This ratio varied appreciably among units (unit averages were a product of even wider differences among individuals, with many men firing 100 percent tracer).

2. All men armed with the M16 had not received formal rifle training in-country (28 percent of the men surveyed indicated that they had not received this training). Percentages of men receiving training varied appreciably among major units. The low percentage (61 percent) in the Americal Division was partially due to responses from members of its 11th brigade, which had been in-country two months and was not required to process personnel through the divisional replacement training center upon arrival in Vietnam.

Major unit statistical data regarding .eroing (<u>Table 4</u>) and failures to extract (<u>Table 5</u>) indicate that:

- 1. Zeroing of rifles varied appreciably among units (the percentage of men who have not zeroed in the 25th Infantry Division was three times greater than that of the 101st Airborne Division).

 Differences among units with respect to personnel turbulence and rate of weapon exchange also contributed to differences in zeroing history.
- 2. Failures to extract have occurred with enough frequency to reduce confidence in the M16. The 1st Marine Division had the highest incidence of this failure (an average of 7.0 failures per man reporting failures within the last four months). Close comparison of failures to extract among units could not be made without more accurate information about unit 5.56mm ammunition consumption rates than the survey produced.

JVI MIGIAMOS

THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE OWNER.

The second second second second

TABLE 1. CLEANING FREQUENCY & UNIT INSPECTIONS BY UNITAL

UNIT		CLEANING (Mumber of Ti	CLEANING FREQUENCY ber of Times Per Month)	(1	1 X	UNIT MAINTENANCE INSPECTIONS (% Indicating Inspections are Conducted)	NCE INSPECII	ONS onducted)
	RIF	RIPLES	MAGAZINES &	. AMMUNITION	2	RIFLES	MAGAZINES	MACAZINIS & AMMINITION
1st Inf Div	21.0	(109)	8.7	(109)	216	(100)	787	(60)
lst Afr Cav Div	18.3	(143)	5.1	(143)	64%	(120)	227	(50)
4th Inf Div	22.5	(75)	4.8	(41)	289	(37)	232	(70)
ech Inf Div	21.6	(419)	8.4	(419)	762	7	647	(371)
25th Inf Div	19.5	(62)	6.3	(08)	872	(77)	- 63%	(65)
Americal Div	21.9	(284)	0.6	(582)	799	- (273)	266	(716)
101st Abn Div	26.1	(63)	11.1	(63)	827	(28)	717	(57)
Sep Brigades (173d & 199th)	23.1	(54)	6.6	(54)	80%	~	717	(41)
Other USARV Units	. 16.8		6.9	(693)	817	(628)	679	
1st Marine Div	24.9	(124)	10.8	(124)	100%	(119)	78%	(105)
٠					•		:	
THEATER AVERAGE	20.4	(2004)	8.1	(2011)	762	(1868)	612	(1341)

^{1.} Numbers contained within parenthesis are total men responding to the question.

16

TABLE .. LUBRICATION OF AMMUNITION, TEST FIRING & BUFFER RETROFIT BY UNIT!

			ACTI	VITY		•
UNIT		OF AMMUNITION on Ammunition oricated)	TEST E (% Indicat Test Fire	ing They DO	(% Indica	RETROFIT ting They HAVE er Installed)
lst Inf Div	81%	(103)	96%	(107)	93%	(109)
lst Air Cav Div	79%.	(140) .	84%	(128)	87%	(142)
4th Inf Div	. 76%	(51)	79%	(43)	69%	(51)
9th Inf Div	65%	(390)	85%	(407)	85%	(419)
25th Inf Div	78%	(76)	84%	(77)	89%	(80)
Americal Div	74%	(271)	87%	(281)	93%	(283)
101st Abn Div	66%	(62)	95%	(. 61)	78%	(63)
Sep Brigades (173d & 199th)	64%	(53)	73%	(52)	93%	(54)
Other USARV Units	82%	(660)	74%	(631)	78%	(693)
lst Marine Div	94%	(116)	92%	(124)	93%	(124)
THEATER AVERAGE	77%	(1922)	82%	(1911)	847.	(2018)

^{1.} Numbers contained within parenthesis are total men responding to the question.

TABLE 3. AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION & MIG TRAINING IN VIETNAM BY UNITY

						ACTIV	ITY
UNIT	(Consu	AMMUNIT	ION CONS			inition)	FORMAL M16 TRAINING IN VIETNA (7 Indicating Training WAS)
	BALL	TRACER	BALL	TO ?	TRACI	R RATIO	Received in Vietnam)
lst Inf Div	79%	21%	3.8	:	1	(109)	78% (107)
lst Air Cav Div	79%	21%	3.8	:	1	(143)	74% (128)
4th Inf Div	91%	9%	10.1	:	1	(51)	76% (45)
9th Inf Div	73%	27%	2.7	:	1	(419)	85% (377)
25th Inf Div	85%	15%	5.7	:	1	(80)	68% (78)
Americal Div	73%	27%	2.7	:	1	(285)	61% (241)
101st Abn Div	72%	28%	2.6	:	1	(63)	77% (53)
Sep Brigades (173d & 199th)	83%	17%	4.9	:	1	(54)	69% (49)
Other USARV Units	85%	15%	5.7	:	1	(693)	63% (597)
1st Marine Div	93%	7%	13.3	:	1	(124)	89% (123)
THEATER AVERAGE	80%	20%	4.0	:	1	(2021)	72% (1798)

on the contraction of the contra

^{1.} Numbers contained within parenthesis are total men responding to the question.

TABLE 4. ZEROING HISTORY BY UNIT

	ZEROING HISTORY							4
UNIT	Never	Zeroed	L	ed W/in 3 Months 1/		ed Over	Total Respon	
1st Inf Div	8%	(8)	60%	(61)	32%	(32)	100%	(101
lst Air Cav Div	8%	(11)	417	(54)	50%	(66)	100%	(131
4th Inf Div	10%	(5)	69%	(33)	21%	(10)	100%	(48
9th Inf Div	16%	(62)	65%	(251)	19%	(73)	100%	(386
25th Inf Div	25%	(19)	19%	(14)	56%	(42)	100%	(75
Americal Div	11%	(30)	64%	(174)	24%	(66)	100%	(270
101st Abn Div	7%	(4)	73%	(43)	20%	(12)	100%	(59
Sep Brigades (173d & 199th)	14%	(6)	55%	(24)	32%	(14)	100%	(44
Other USARV Units	5%	(28)	50%	(300)	46%	(275)	100%	(603
1st Marine Div	6%	(7)	87%	(104)	7%	. (8)	100%	(119
THEATER AVERAGE	10%	(180)	58%	(1058)	33%	(598)	100%	(1835

hill hindrighmenthe de service de

Direct comparison among units is misleading since the average length of time in country varie, among units.

TABLE 5. FAILURE TO EXTRACT BY UNIT

	FAILURE TO EXTRACTLY						
TINU	7 Indicating No Failures		% Indicating One or More Failures		Average No. of Failures (Per Man Reporting Failures)	Total Men Responding to Question	
1st Inf Div	687	(64)	32%	(30)	5.2	100%	(94)
ist Air Cav Div	55%	(63)	45%	(52)	4.9	100%	(115)
4th Inf Div	687	(25)	32%	(12)	3.2	100%	(37)
9th Inf Div	56%	(135)	44%	(104)	4.5	100%	(239)
25th Inf Div	73%	(54)	27%	(20)	5.0	100%	(74)
Americal Div	55%	(64)	457	(52)	4.4	1007	(116)
101st Abn Div	447	(23)	567	(29)	6.3	100%	(52)
Sep Brigades (173d & 199th)	57%	(28)	437	(21)	5.6	100%	(49)
Other USARV Units	76%	(432)	247	(136)	3.9	100%	(568)
ist Marine Div	52%	(37)	48%	(34)	7.0	100%	(71)
THEATER AVERAGE	65%	(925)	35%	(490)	4.8	1002	(1415)

^{1.} Occurring w/in last four months

M16 Training

Training before Vietnam.

A total of 23 percent of all men questioned who came direct from the Continental United States indicated that they had received no formal M16 training prior to arrival in Vietnam (<u>Table 6</u>). Of those men from all other theaters, 73 percent stated they had not received such training before arrival (<u>Table 6</u>). The pronounced tendency for non-CONUS replacements to be untrained was to be expected since M16's were not generally available for training outside of the CONUS training base (84 percent of all men indicating they were non-CONUS replacements were from units in Germany).

nachterriche eine eine eine er einer erren precke betrechte er errechte er errechte bescher er errechte er err

How serious the lack of M16 training for men prior to their arrival in Vietnam depends upon how these men are employed after their arrival. Of those men who indicated they had not received any formal M16 training prior to arrival in Vietnam examination by MOS (<u>Table 7</u>), duty position (<u>Table 8</u>), and grade (<u>Table 9</u>). suggests that:

- 1. Many of the men untrained on the M16 before their arrival in Vietnam were assigned to infantry battalions (35 percent of untrained men noted in the sample had MOS's common to infantry battalions).
- 2. A significant number of men in this group were in grades and duty positions that required them to have detailed knowledge

COMPIDENTIAL

of the rifle to meet their supervisory responsibilities (16 percent of this untrained group were either fire team leaders, squad leaders, or platcon sergeants and 80 percent of them were in grades E-4 through E-6).

3. The tendency of men in this M16 untrained-before-Vietnam group to be leaders was even more pronounced among non-CONUS replacements (22 percent of non-CONUS M16 untrained men were either fire team leaders, squad leaders or platoon sergeants and 75 percent were in grades E-4 through E-6).

o strong three sections of the contract of the

Although a high percentage of mer indicated they had not received any M16 rifle training before arrival in Vietnam (24 percent), there is good reason to believe that this problem will be reduced significantly in the near future. Examination of the untrained-before-Vietnam group by deployment month (Table 10) reveals a pronounced trend toward reduction of the numbers of men slipping through without M16 training (only 4 percent of the men deploying during October 1967 - January 1968 indicated they were untrained).

Training in Vietnam.

All men armed with the M16 had not received formal rifle training in-country (28 percent of the men surveyed said they had not received this training). Percentages of men receiving M16 training varied appreciably among major units (<u>Table 3</u>).

Conviction.

USARV M16 training policies and procedures did not distinguish among replacements by theater source or by the amount of rifle training men have received before their arrival in Vietnam. The number of untrained replacements which have arrived in Vietnam suggests consideration of two training programs, the present one for most men and another more intensive one for the untrained. If two programs are not established, then, as a minimal measure, a system should be used which guarantees that the untrained replacements will have a higher probability of receiving in-country training than those with previous training.

Adequate training policies, guidance, and directives have been published by Headquarters, MACV, and Headquarters, USARV. These directives were not consistently available among units conducting replacement training at the time of the survey.

M16 training observed at divisional replacement centers did not always comply with MACV or USARV training directives.

Unit Armorers

Many unit armorers lacked formal training and adequate knowledge of M16 rifle maintenance. As a result of this failing, many rifles that properly should have been repaired by the unit armorer (a rifle with a broken extractor, for example) were turned in by the rifleman and repaired at a higher echelon. Other unit armorer duties, such as periodic lubrication of detent springs, were often neglected.

TABLE 6. M16 TRAINING "BEFORE" VIETNAM BY THEATER SOURCE

M16 TRAINING	THEATER		
BEFORE VIETNAM	CONUS	NON-CONUS	TOTALS
YES	77% (1506)	27% (12)	76% (1518)
Ю	23% (445)	73% (32)	24% (477)
TOTALS	100% (1951)	100% (44)	100% (1995)

TABLE 7. THEATER SOURCE BY MOS FOR THOSE MEN WHO INDICATED THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY FORMAL M16 TRAINING PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN VIETNAM

·	THEATER SOURCE			
MOS	CONUS	NON-CONUS	TOTALS	
llB (Light Wpns Infantryman)	13% (58)	28% (9)	14% (67)	
11C (Inf Indirect Fire Crewman)	4% (18)	3% (1)	4% (19)	
-11D (Armor Intel Specialist)	2% (8)	6% (2)	2% (10)	
<pre>11G (Inf Senior Sergeant)</pre>	- (0)	- (0)	- (0)	
11H (Inf Direct Fire Crewman)	1% (4)	- (0)	17 (4)	
31B & F (Radio Mech & Com- munication Chief)	3% (13)	- (0)	37 (13)	
36A (Wireman)	17 (3)	3% (1)	17 (4)	
64A, B & C (Drivers)	3% (15)	6% (2)	47, (17)	
71A & B (Clerk & Clerk Typist)	2% (9)	3% (1)	27. (10)	
76K (Gen Supply Specialist)	- (0)	- (0)	- (0)	
94A & B (Cooks)	37. (15)	6% (2)	47, (17)	
All Other Enl	67% (300)	44% (14)	65% (314)	
1542 (Inf Off)	<17. (2)	- (0)	<17 (2)	
TOTALS	100% (445)	100% (32)	100% (477)	

Percentages apply only to responses of YES or NO.
 There were 26 non-responses - #11 by men from CONUS.

TABLE 8. THEATER SOURCE BY DUTY POSITION FOR THOSE MEN WHO INDICATED THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY FORMAL M16 TRAINING PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN VIETNAM

		THEATER	TOTALS	
DUTY POSITION	CONUS			
Other or No Response	73%	(323)	53% (17)	71% (340)
Rifleman .	72	(33)	16% (5)	8% (38)
Grenadier	< 17	(1)	- (0)	< 1% (1)
Auto Rifleman	17.	(4)	- (0)	17. (4)
Fire Team Ldr	27.	(1)	3% (1)	3% (12)
Squad Ldr	10%	(46)	167 (5)	11% (51)
Pistoon Sgt	2%	(8)	3% (1)	27, (9)
Ilat Ldr/CO	17	(4)	- (0)	17 (4)
RTO/Wireman	3%	(15)	67. (2)	4% (17)
Armorer	-	(0)	3% (1)	417 (1)
TOTALS	100%	(445)	100% (32)	100% (477)

n et de light de lange de lang

TABLE 9. THEATER SOURCE BY GRADE FOR THOSE MEN WHO INDICATED THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY FORMAL M16 TRAINING PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN VIETNAM

C0 405	THEATER		
GRADE	CONUS	MON-CONUS	TOTALS
Other or			•
No Response	27, (8)	- (0)	2% (8)
E-1 thru E-3	16% (69)	25% (8)	16% (77)
E-4	47% (208)	417 (13)	45% (221)
E-5	27% (122)	22% (7)	27% (129)
E-6	7% (29)	12% (4)	7% (33)
E-7 thru E-9	17 (5)	- (0)	1% (5)
0-1 thru 0-4	17 (4)	- (0)	17 (4)
TOTALS	100% (445)	100% (32)	100% (477)

TABLE 10. RECEIPT OF FORMAL M16 TRAINING BEFORE ARRIVAL IN VIETNAM BY DEPLOYMENT MONTH

MONTH OF	RECEIPT OF FORMAL M16 TRAINING BEFORE VN					
DEPLOYMENT	YES		Ю		TOTALS	
Jan 68	96%	(153)	47.	(6)	100%	159
Dec 67	987	(123)	2%	(2)	100%	125
Nov 67	93%	(89)	7%	(7)	100%	96
Oct 67	967.	(107)	47.	(5)	100%	11:
Sep 67	87%	(61)	13%	(9)	100%	70
Aug 67	837.	(95)	17%	(19)	100%	11
Jul 67	92%	(56)	87.	(5)	100%	6
Jun 67	80%	(74)	20%	(18)	100%	9:
May 67	85%	(89)	15%	(16)	100%	10
Apr 67	837.	(86)	17%	(18)	100%	10
Mar 67	80%	(139)	20%	(35)	100%	17
Feb 67	58%	(359)	42%	(260)	100%	61
Jan 67	69%	(37)	317	(17)	100%	. 5
Dec 66	62%	(8)	387	(5)	100%	1
Nov 66	187	(2)	827	(9)	100%	1
Oct 66	437	(3)	57%	(4)	100%	
Sep 66	40%	(2)	60%	(3)	100%	
Aug 66	317	(11)	697	(24)	100%	3
Jul 66	50%	(7)	50%	(7)	100%	1
Jun 65	807	(4)	20%	(1)	1007	
TOTALS	75%	(1505)	247	(470)	100%	197

THE BELLEVIEW SERVICE SERVICE

Maintenance and Supply

Adequate quantities of repair parts, cleaning materials and equipment were generally available in Vietnam. However, unbalanced distribution among depots occasionally resulted in temporary shortages which affected using units. For example, some units reported shortages of bore brushes with due-ins over two months old, while the theater had not been totally out of stock since November 1967.

Cleaning materials such as the cleaning rod, lubricant, brushes, and patches, were generally available to the rifleman and he usually carried most items with him in the field (see questions 5 and 6, Section X). Pipe cleaners and bore cleaner, however, were often not available.

Unit armorers frequently did not accompany units into the field and as a consequence, field repair of weapons was neglected.

Greater use of contact teams would reduce this problem and would also compensate for lack of skill among unit armorers.

The quality of maintenance by the rifleman was directly influenced by the degree of supervisory emphasis placed on care and cleaning within the unit. Men tended to clean their rifles two to three times more frequently than they cleaned their magazines and ammunition (Table 1). This trend was encouraged through unit maintenance

inspections which also emphasized the rifle rather than the entire rifle system. Additional information regarding cleaning frequency and unit inspections is displayed in questions 21, 26, and 28 of Section X.

Survey data supports two product improvements presently under development.

- The desire for magazines of greater capacity than 20 rounds was frequently expressed.
- 2. On-weapon storage capacity for cleaning materials is required. This was demonstrated by the data contained in question 6h of Section X, which indicates that there was no means generally satisfactory to the rifleman for carrying these materials.

 Reliability and Acceptability.

Failures to extract still occurred with enough frequency to reduce confidence in the M16. (Table 5) Among those men surveyed, 35 percent had experienced at least one such failure within the previous four months (the average number of reported failures was 4.8). Attempts to establish a statistically significant correlation between failures and such possible causes as cleaning habits, overlubrication, and the extent or recency of the user's mechanical training were unsuccessful. The fact that it has been impossible to statistically isolate the causitive factors from field survey data

COMMENTAL

suggests that failures to extract were caused by more than one variable. That is, the problem was not with maintenance, ammunition, or defective parts alone but was rather a combination of several variables. Consequently, system reliability can be improved only by continued product improvement and user effort.

A total of 42 percent of those surveyed indicated they had experienced at least one failure to lock. (Of those reporting this failure, the average number of failures was 5.3; see question 12, Section X.)

O O STANDARDE LINGUES DE LES DE LES DE LES DE LES DES DE LES DE L

Half of the men reported having used the bolt assist and most of these (69 percent) indicated that use of the bolt assist had cleared the malfunction. (See question 13, Section X.)

Data relating to weapon performance and acceptability are shown in the answers to questions 29, 30, and 31 of Section X. In general, men armed with the M16 in Vietnam rated this rifle's performance high. Most frequently lauded were its light weight and its firepower. However, many men entertained some misgivings about the M16's reliability (33 percent of the men surveyed made adverse comments on either the rifle's sensitivity or its reliability). When asked what weapon they would prefer to carry in combat, 85 percent indicated that they wanted either the M16 or its submachine gun version, the XM177E1-2. The Office Secretary of Defense field survey conducted five months earlier reported: "Less than one half of one percent of

of all personnel interviewed stated that they would exchange their M16 for another rifle." This difference in acceptance figures may reflect differences in data collection techniques. The Office Secretary of Defense survey derived its 99.5 percent acceptance figure from personal interviews, primarily of leaders, rather than from anonymous questionnaires completed by everyone armed with the weapon. While the 85 percent acceptance figure obtained by this survey does not show a particularly high leve! of confidence in the M16, continued introduction of the chrome chambered model, with its expected lower incidence of failures to extract, should improve user confidence. Many men who had recently received an M16 with a chrome chamber indicated that the rifle was significantly more reliable than earlier models they had used.

General Usage.

Test firing data displayed in Tables 2, 11, and 12 indicates:

- . 1. Extent of test firing varied appreciably among units (this is an activity strongly influenced by unit standard operating procedures and command emphasis).
- 2. A greater percentage of leaders, from fire team to platoon level, test fired than men within the rifle squads. (This fact suggests that leaders know what should be done but do not always insist upon performance from their men.)

3. Maneuver battalions test fired more than other units - 87 percent of personnel in maneuver battalions indicated that they test fired as compared to 77 percent in other units.

Zeroing information contained in Tables 4, 13, 14, and 15 reflect:

- 1. Within the theater, 10 percent of the men armed with the M16 had never zeroed their rifles. An additional 33 percent had not confirmed their zero within three months. (USARV quarterly training re rements include zeroing of rifles.)
- There was no significant difference in zeroing trends by duty position.
- 3. The need for zeroing was particularly pronounced within maneuver battalions. Despite the fact that zeroing was done more frequently in maneuver battalions (see question 8 in Section X), 12 percent of the men in these battalions had never zeroed as compared to 8 percent in other units. A rapid turnover in men and more frequent exchanges of weapons probably contributed to the greater need for zeroing within maneuver battalions than in other units.
- 4. The zeroing history of men who have completed their 12 month tours in Vietnam is shown in Table 15. This table permits a more accurate evaluation of zeroing frequency, since the total

sample contains men with various lengths of time in Vietnam. Table
15 indicates that 10 percent of all men never zeroed, about half zeroed
quarterly (according to USARV directives), and about one-fourth
zeroed when their weapon was issued at the beginning of their tour
and never thereafter.

The average ammunition load carried was from 39 to 41 normal consumption days of ammunition. Variance in the amount of ammunition carried was quite pronounced (loads varied from seven to over 40 magazines). Although user estimates of ammunition consumption tend to be inflated, the survey data displayed in Table 16 support the judgment that men carry more ammunition than they need.

Most men loaded 18 rounds in their magazines (the theater average is 18.3 rounds).

The consumption ratio of ball to tracer ammunition varied appreciably among units (<u>Table 3</u>) and unit averages were a product of even wider differences among individuals, with many men firing .

100 percent tracer.

Men estimated that they used the automatic mode of fire about 34 percent of the time and that about 60 percent of their automatic fire was expended in short bursts.

TABLE 11. TEST FIRING BY DUTY POSITION

DUTY POSITION		TEST FIRINGLY		
	(% Indicating The	ey <u>DO</u> Test Fire Rifles		
Other or No Response	78%	(1013)		
Rifleman	86%	(361)		
Grenadier	100%	(9)		
Auto Rifleman	79%	(29)		
Fire Team Ldr	90%	(103)		
Squad Ldr	90%	(232)		
Platoon Sgt	97%	(38)		
Plat Ldr/CO	95%	(21)		
RTO/Wireman	83%	(102)		
Armorer	100%	(3)		
THEATER AVERAGE	827	(1911)		

^{1.} Numbers contained in parenthesis are total men responding to the question.

TABLE 12. TEST FIRING BY TYPE UNIT

TYPE UNIT	TEST FIRINGL/ (7 Indicating They DO Test Fire Rifles)			
Maneuver Battalion	87%	(984)		
Other	77%	(926)		
THEATER AVERAGE	827	(1910)		

THE PARTY OF THE P

^{1.} Numbers contained in parenthesis are total men responding to the question.

TABLE 13. ZEROING HISTORY BY DUTY POSITION

				ZEROING	HISTORY			
DUTY POSITION	Never	Zeroed	Last	ed W/in 3 Months		ed Over ths Ago	Resp	l Men onding uestion
Other or No Response	10%	(95)	52%	(501)	38%	(370)	100%	966
Rifleman	12%	(44)	67%	(246)	217.	(75)	100%	365
Grenadier	-	(0)	50%	(2)	50%	(2)	100%	4
Auto Rifleman	4%	(1)	89%	(25)	7%	(2)	100%	28
Fire Team Ldr	12%	(12)	62%	(63)	26%	(27)	100%	102
Squad Ldr	87.	(17)	59%	(128)	337	(72)	100%	217
Platoon Sgt	-	(0)	56%	(18)	44%	(14)	100%	32
Plat Ldr/CO	5%	(1)	55%	(11)	40%	(8)	100%	20
RTO/Wireman	10%	(10)	62%	(61)	28%	(28)	100%	99
Armorer	-	(0)	100%	(3)	-	(0)	100%	3
THEATER AVERAGE	10%	(180)	58%	(1058)	33%	(598)	100%	1836

TABLE 14. ZEROING HISTORY BY TYPE UNIT

			2	EROING HISTO	DRY			
TYPE UNIT	Never	Zeroed	1	oed W/in 3 Months		ed Over oths Ago	. Total Respon to Que	ding
Mancuver Battalion	127	(112)	60%	(573)	287.	(267)	100%	952
Other	87,	(68)	55%	(4. 2)	38%	(334)	100%	8 7
THEATER AVERAGE	10%	(180)	58%	(1058)	337.	(601)	100%	1859

TABLE 15. ZEROING HISTORY BY MONTH FOR ONLY THOSE HAVING TWELVE MONTHS IN VIETNAM

TIME SINCE ZEROING			ZEROING	HISTORY		
(In Months)	By Month		By Quart	er	By 3 Mont and Over	hs or Less 3 Months
Never Zeroed	10%	(51)	10%	(51)	10%	(51)
. 1	20%	(109)			}	•
2	18%	(.96)	48%	(261)	48%	(261)
3	10%	(56)				
4	47.	(24)				
5	5%	(26)	11%	(61)		
6	27.	(11)				
7	3%	(15)				
8	47.	(21)	8%	(44)	42%	(227)
9	17	(8)				
10	17.	(8)				
11	37.	(15)	23%	(122)		
12	187	(99)				
	₩				 	•
TOTALS	100%	539	100%	539	100%	539

⁽Average Time Since Zeroing)
(Standard Deviation) 4.96 months

and the state of t

^{4.39} months

TABLE 16. APPUNITION LOAD BY TYPE UNIT

	7777		UNIT	
	ITEM	Maneuver Bn	All Other	Theater
۵.	Total Rounds Carried	338 rounds	258 rounds	300 rounds
ь.	Total Magazines Carried	16.6 magazines	11.3 magazines	14.0 magazines
c.	Largest consumption ever experienced in a single day of com- bat	293 rounds/ day	327 rounds/1/ day	308 rounds/day
d.	Total consumption (within last 4 months)	1040 rounds	750 rounds	878 rounds
е.	Average Daily consumption(d # 120)	8.67 rounds/ day	6.25 rounds/ day	7.32 rounds/day
£.	Ammunition Load: Ave Consumption Days (a ÷ é)	39 days	41 days	41 days
	Eax Consumption days	1.15 davs	0.79 davs	0.97 davs

This figure appears to be an inflated estimate made by men who are less experienced than those in maneuver battalions (it should be smaller than the battalion figure of 293 rounds.)

CORFIDEUTIAL

IX. Conclusions and Recommendations

Policies and directives throughout Vietnam which govern M16 training, supply, maintenance, and user care and cleaning were generally adequate. Continued command supervision is necessary to improve compliance with these directives.

With the exception of Vietnam-oriented advanced individual training for infantrymen, all M16 training given to men prior to deployment should be improved. Many leaders were hampered in meeting their supervisory responsibilities by insufficient knowledge of the M16. Frequently, riflemen received either poor M16 training or none before they arrived in Vietnam. (Recently improved clearance procedures within the continental United States have reduced the numbers of men who deploy without rifle training.) In order to improve predeployment rifle training the following measures should be taken:

- 1. Accelerate introduction of M16 rifles and M16 training for all men in basic combat training at the earliest possible date.
- 2. Increase M16 instruction for supervisors in all schools producing junior leaders: for example, NCO refresher courses, officer candidate schools, and basic branch courses.
- 3. Establish procedures to insure receipt of M16 training for men on intertheater transfer to Vietnam.

USARV required all replacements to complete the same M16 training program. The large number of untrained replacements that have arrived in Vietnam suggest use of two training programs, the present one for most men and another and more intensive one for the totally untrained.

Unit armorers frequently lacked formal training and adequate knowledge of M16 rifle maintenance. Provision for additional training, perhaps through divisional schools or mobile training teams from the 1st Logistical Command, should be made.

Men tended to clean their rifles two to three times more frequently than their magazines. Corroded or dirty ammunition and defective magazines seriously reduce rifle effectiveness. Unit maintenance inspections should emphasize care of the entire rifle system.

Adequate quantities of repair parts and cleaning materials and equipment were generally available in Vietnam. However, unbalanced distribution among depots occasionally resulted in temporary shortages which affected rifle maintenance. Procedures to achieve optimum distribution should be instituted.

Although individuals usually test fired their rifles, the nature and frequency of such firing varied widely among and within units. Test firing, when properly performed, will increase weapon reliability. Significant improvement in rifle effectiveness will

be achieved by:

- 1. Isolation of defective rifles and magazines through periodic test firing by individuals in a combat zone. Design of a standard test firing procedure to accomplish this purpose should be developed by the Project Manager Rifles.
- Continued command emphasis upon the importance of frequent and properly conducted test firing.

Greater zeroing effort is required, particularly within maneuver battalions. The average frequency of zeroing was every 4.96 months and 10 percent of the men had never zeroed their rifles. Zeroing increases both hit probability and user confidence in his rifle. It also stimulates the appropriate use of aimed fire. Verification of zero should be integrated with test firing, since any object that can visibly register hits may serve as a target.

Performance and acceptability data collected during the survey indicate:

- 1. The M16's high rate of lethal fire and light weight are qualities particularly suitable for the war in Vietnam.
- 2. Failures to extract still occurred with enough frequency to reduce confidence in the M16. These failures apparently result from a variety of causes. Factors which could contribute are inadequate maintenance, care and clausing, and control of ammunition case hardness, or from pitted chambers, or defective parts.

Consequently, both continued product improvement and user effort are necessary.

- 3. Introduction of the chromed chamber appeared to reduce the number of failures to extract. However, this improvement has not been fielded long enough to permit adequate evaluation.
- 4. Most men armed with the M16 in Vietnam rated this rifle's performance high, however, many men entertained some misgivings about the M16's reliability. When asked what weapon they preferred to carry in combat, 85 percent indicated that they wanted either the M16 or its submachine gun version, the XM177E1-2. (The M14 was preferred by 15 percent, while less than one percent wished to carry either the Stoner rifle, the AK-47, the carbine or a pistol.)
- 5. A field malfunction reporting system should be established throughout USARV. While such a system does not produce reliability data with laboratory precision, it does permit analysis of malfunction trends and would contribute to further improvement in the reliability of the M16.

X. Frequency Distributions of Responses to Questionnaire

A series of frequency distributions displaying all responses to each item of the questionnaire were prepared to support the analysis. Each distribution is included in this section except where consolidation permitted an omission. Additional information is superimposed upon each of the inclosed distributions to assist in interpretation. (Instructions to assist interpretation of these distributions are contained on the initial distribution, page 44.)

A listing of each frequency distribution prepared follows:

Questionnaire Heading

Where from (theater source)

Major unit

Grade

Months in Vietnam

MOS

Duty position

Questions

- Type and model of whapon used.
- 3.a. Was formal M16 training received before Vietnam?
 - b. Was formal M16 training received in Vietnam?
- 4.a. Hours mechanical training received before Vietnam
 - b. Hours of mechanical training received in Vietnam
- c. Total hours of mechanical training received before and in Vietnam.

..1

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5.a. to g. Do you have cleaning materials (cleaning rod, LSA, chamber brush, bore brush, patches, pipe cleaners and bore cleaner)?
 - 6.a. to g. Do you carry cleaning materials (a. to g.)?
 - h. Where are cleaning materials carried?
 - 7.a. Receipt of new buffer
 - b. Receipt of chrome chamber
- 8.a. to c. Zeroing history (maneuver battalions, all other, and theater)

NORTHWAY OF THE BEACH STREET OF THE PRINCE OF THE PRINCE OF THE SECOND O

- 9.a. Total ball ammunition carried
 - b. Total tracer ammunition carried
 - c. Total ammunition carried (ball and tracer)
- 10. Lubrication of ammunition
- 11.a. to c. Weeks since instruction on care and cleaning of M16, ammunition, and magazines
 - 12. Number of failures to lock
 - 13.a. Use of bolt assist
 - b. Percentage of time use of bolt assist cleared problem14.a. to c. Number of magazines carried (maneuver battalions,
- all others, and theater)
 - 16. Percentage of automatic fire expended in short bursts
- 17.a. to c. Largest number of rounds expended in a single day of combat (maneuver battalions, all others, and theater)

15. Percentage of fire in fully automatic mode

- 18.a. Was care and cleaning card received?
 - b. If issued, is card still in possession?
- 19. Test firing of individual weapons
- 20. Test firing schedule

- 21. M16 rifle cleaning trends
- 22. Number of rounds loaded in magazines
- 23.a. to c. Total rounds fired within last four months (maneuver battalions, all others, and theater)
- 24.a. to c. Failures to extract (maneuver battalions, all others, and theater)
- 25.a. to c. Do rounds stick in chamber when left for periods of 0-8 hours, 9-16 hours, or 17-24 hours?
 - 26.a. Frequency of unit rifle inspections
 - b. Who conducts unit rifle inspections?
 - c. Are unit magazine and ammunition inspections conducted?
 - 27. Amount of tracer ammunition fired
 - 28. Magazine and ammunition cleaning frequency
 - 29. Weapon performance
 - 30.a. to e. What do you like about the M16 system?
 - 31.a. to e. What do you dislike about the M16 system?
 - 32.a. to c. Additional comments


JUFIDENTIAL

HIG STATISFICAL SUMMARIES AS UF ZAFERGB

HILL ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTURES LUCATED IN WORDS . 0.

OUT OF STATEMENT OF LUCATED IN WORDS . 0.

OUT X



ИСМВЕК

An "x" indicates that the number of responses filled up to that level (1960) and a digit (3) was the cverflow, i.e. the total number of responses for interval #i was 1960 + 3 or 1963.

Heading: ' ere from

CONF. TENTIAL

MIS SIMILATION SUMMATICS AS UP 201 EUGH

HISTOLKAM OF DIVISIONS CONCERNED LOCATED IN WORDS		
בס רכ		
CONCERN	ວໍ	
GHS	•	
DIVISE	40AC	
6	E	
STUCKAR	ATTH ASSUCT TEN WETCHTING FALTONS LUCATED IN HORAS	
Ξ	ž	
	FALT	
118	CHING	
• •	it.	
TARBOANDS SCUCIO	Ţ	•
ž	5.161	
140A	A\$	
4773	Ę	

JOR UNIT	NUMBER	109	143	21	. 419	80	285	· 63	54	693	124	2021.
RESPONDENTS BY MAJOR UNIT	UNIT	lst Inf Div	1st Afr Cav Div	4ch Inf Div	9th Inf Div	25th Inf Div	Americal Div	101st Abn Div	173d & 199th Bde	Other USARV	lst Marine Di,	TOTALS
	INTERVAL		2	ю	4	'n	9	7	80	6	01	H
•	-				-							

PERCENTAGE

Heading: Major Unit

100%

CONFIDENTIAL

HID STATISTICAL SUPPARITY AS UP 28FEBBB

LOCATED IN WORDS

ESTANDANDS ULDGIO NE# I HISTOGRAM OF GRADE ALTH ASSUCTATED METGHTING FACTORS LOCATED IN WORDS .

(ADE	NUMBER	20	543	853	777	123	19	21	2021
RESPONDENTS BY GRADE	CRADE	No Response	E-1 thru E-3	E-4	E-S	E-6	E-7 thru E-9	0-1 thru 0-4	TOTALS
	INTERVAL		2	e	4	S	9	7	į.

PERCENTAGE

43% 277

> > Weading: Grade

1002 (2001)

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERVAL

CONFTENTIAL

MIG STATISTICAL SUMMANIES AS OF 28FEBBB

LOCATED IN WORDS

63/ANDARD< BLOCLO, MIG 1 HISTOGRAM OF MONTHS IN VIETNAM JH ASSOCIATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LOCATED IN WORDS , 0, 650

	1001	2013	TOTALS	TOT	
	8%	157	Over 12	14-25	•
	31%	631	. 12	. 13	
	. ,26	176	11	. 12	-
	5%	107	10	. 11	•
-	5%;	. 105	6	10	
	. 5%	92	60	6	•
:-	3%	65	7	80	
	29	115	. 9	7	:
-	3%	. 70	5	v	
6 (8td dev)=4.49	29	112	4	8	
<u>:</u> - \	5%	96	6	4	· ·
X (ave)=8.65 mos	29	126	8	е	
	. 82	. 159	. :	8	:
•	. 212		Less Than 1	-	,
		,			
	PERCENTAGE	NUMBER	MONTHS	INTERVAL	
· .	VIETNAM	WHER OF HONTHS IN VIETNAM	6	RESPONDENTS	

Heading: Number of Months in Vietnam

on the property of the constitution of the con

COL-IDENTIAL

SIMILATICAL SUMMARITS A. UF 28FTEE

3	ANDARUC	** ***********************************	0 E	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	ICAL SU	HHAN IFS	WIG STATISTICAL SUMMARITS AS UF 28FTB60 WIM I HISTOGRAM OF MGS +SEE REFERENCE	ar ruba PERENC	E+ LOCATED IN WORDS	IN MORDS 6.	/•	· -
10041	1 ASSUC	ATED WE ISS	2	FACTURS	LCCATE		•	ب ة		RESPONDENTS	S BY MOS	
34.0	: ×:				•	•			TATERVAL	MOS	MINABER	DEBCENTACE
2 .	κ,		•					_	THIENAUT	201	100 mg	בהתבוודטמה
22.	< ≺									•		
2830	×			•					,			
098	×		•	•		٠			_	All Others	984	767
מים מים	~ ×			•	-				9	118	189	34%
600	×							_				1
740	×				•			_		110	. 137	. 2/
3 2	< ≺							_	16	110	97	27.
27	×										,	•
20.	~ ;			•				_	21	116	m	× 17
9 0	< ×								31	1542	15	17
040	×				•		•		•		: ;	:
920	* * * >		•	٠					36	37.8	61 :	17
3 3	. ×								37	31F	74	1 12
2 .	*** **								1.7	. ,,	:	•
223	< ×							-	;		;	*,
25.	۷,					•		•	. 97	64A.	. 19	17
	· ×								77	648	24	17
4.4.0	: ч		•	٠						277		: 1
77	~ ;								č.	2	>	
3 200	* *								15	71A	0	١
360	× ;					•		_		916		17.
220	< ×			•					70 .	97)		•
200	×							•	26	76K	٠.	× 17
202.	× ×								19	0,4	-	į
250	(×								3	4	· :	
750	×:								62	876	35	27.
200	×											
7100	×					•		٠.				
0 1	* '	٠,٠							į.	TOTALS	2020	2001
27	< ×	< ×						_	•		1	

INTERVAL 12345

Heading: Primary MOS

PORLUERING

門できるというないのでは、

HIG STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AS OF 28FEBGB

ASTANDARDS BLOCIO, NT# 1 HISTOGRAM OF DUTY POSITION HITH ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTURS LOCATED IN MORDS , 0, 1000

INTERVAL DUTY POSITION NUMBER PERCENTAGE 1			 					 -					
DUTY POSITION Others - or No Response Rifleman Grenadier Auto Rifleman Fire Team Ldr Squad Ldr Plat Sgt Plat Ldr, Co Comdr Anmo Bearer, RTU, Wireman Armorer		PERCENTAGE	1	217	12	32 .	12%	25%	7.4	27.	122	Z1 7.	1002
Othe Rifi Gren Auto Fire Squa Plat Anmo Anmo	SITION	NUMBER	1077	384	01	53	109	239	39	21	110	3	2021
1	RESPONDENTS BY DUTY PO	DUTY POSITION	Others - or No Response	Rifleman	Grenadier	Auto Rifleman	Fire Team Ldr	Squad Ldr	Plat Sgt	Plat Ldr. Co Comdr .	Anno Bearer, RTO, Wireman		TALS
		INTERVAL		2	m	4	S	9	7	80	6	01 -	OL L

илжеек

meacing; Duty Position

CONFIDENTIAL

OF MEAPONS	IN MURUS				
CSTANDAND BLOCIO, NICH INSTOCRAM OF MEAPONS U	DKS LUCAICU				
MT# L				•	
610019	DISK DSIV				
VOK VOK	3000	~	×	×	×

-		WEAPONS PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION	SSESSION	•	
	INTERVAL	NEAPON .	NUMBER	PERCENTAGÈ	
:					
	-	No Answer	. 15	1	
	7	H14.	15	× 17	
٠		Mi6 - w/o New Buffer	. 298	157	:
	4 7		1063	53%	
;	s	M16 - w/New Buffer & Chrome	629	312	
į					_
i	Ş.	P. COTA ! G	2020	1001	
				(2005)	

Question 1: Type and Model Weapon Used

CONFIDENTIAL

COTTIDENTIAL

TO THE PERSON NAMED IN THE

SUNX GUIPUT -- VERSIGN NA.

RECEIPT OF FORMAL HIG TRAINING BEFORE VIETNAM NUMBER . 1518 2021 56 477 No Response RESPONSE TOTALS INTERVAL

MUMBER

192 24%

PERCENTAGE

Question 3a: Receipt of Mi6 Training BEFORE Vietnam

(1995) 1001

i ji Interval

HIS STAILSHEAL SHERKHES AS OF CHILDEN

SSTANDANDC BLOCIO, ATA I HISTOGRAM OF TRAINING IN R.V. MITH ASSUCIATED M. LIGHTING FACTIMS LUCATED IN MUKDS , 0,

LOCATED IN MORDS

RECET	RECEIPT OF FORMAL HIG TRAINING IN VIETNAM	TRAINING IN	I VIETNAM
INTERVAL	RESPONSE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
	٠		
	No Response	222	1
~	Yes	1292.	. 72% .
е •	2	206	28%
ž	TOTALS	2020	100%
-			(1798)

Question 3b: Receipt of Mi6 Training IN Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

COMFICMTIAL

The second secon

SURX GUIPUT -- VERSION MA MIG STATISTICAL SURHARY AS UP ZULFIIGE

::	
HISTOGHAM OF MECH. THAIN. WIFURE ON LUCATED IN NORDS	
LUCATED	
2	
N.ISLF URE	ċ
3	•
4E CH. 13	MINIOS
<u>.</u>	ž
STOCHAN O	LUCATED
=	FACTURS
Z	ICHI ING
BLINC 10,	ATLO WE
\$51 ANDARUS	WILL ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LUCATED IN WINDS

	HOURS MECHA	HOURS MECHANICAL TRAINING RECEIVED . BEFORE VIETNAM	RECEIVED - B	SFORE VIETHAM	
	INTERVAL	HOURS	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE	:
					:
		None	584	32%	
	. 2	1	133	77	: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
	m	2	223	127	
	4	e.	75	27	
		4	161	102	
	S	'n	85	. 22	X (ava)=5.2 hours mechanica
	7	9	58	3%	-
	8			17	(ntd dev) #8.2, hours.
	6	8	164	26	
	10	6		۸ ۲	
	11	01	06	52	- :
~ =< 3	12-31	11-30	157	. 26	
	32-81	31-80	99.	25	43
20 K.1	98-100	No Response.	190	1	:
****		TOTALS ·	2021	100%	

KINGER

al tng

INTERVAL 12 1454 PETAL 10

Question 4A: Bours mechanical training received BEFORE Vietnam

COL" IDENTIAL

BIG STATESTICAL SUPPARY AS OF 2811108

PERCENTAGE HOURS MECHANICAL TRAINING RECEIVED IN VIETNAM (1580) LUCATED IN MORDS NGAIBER 2021 GSTANDARUC BLUCLO, NT# 1 HISTOGRAM OF MECH, FRAIN, IN VN ATTER A SAIGTATED ME MORES , 0, No Response HOURS TOTALS INTERVAL

Question 4a: Hours Mechanical Training IN VN

CONFIDENTA S.

CONFIL NTIAL

The water the state of the stat

MIS STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AS OF 281 EBGB

STANDAMDS BLUCIO. HT# 1 HISTOGRAM OF CLFANING ROD IN UNIT LOCATED IN WOFDS WITH ASSULTATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LUCATED IN WORDS.

NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all seven histograms on Question 5.

	2	YOU HAVE	DO YOU HAVE CLEANING MATERIALS?	ATERIALS?			,
MITEM	(NO RESPONSE)	I NYE	INTERVAL 2	INTE	INTERVAL 3 (NO)	TOTAL	. MEN NDING
	-						
Cleaning Rod	103	2/6	(1862)	3%	(54)	1001	1916
LSA Lubricant	103	912	(1739)	¥6.	(179)	2001	1918
Chamber Brunh	103	93%	(1784)	7.2	(134)	100%	1918
Bore Brush	103	256	(1802)	. 52	(116)	1001	1918
Pipo Cloaners	104	269	(1328)	31%	(589)	1001	1917
Patches	. 104	216	(1754)	2,0	. (163)	. 2001	1917
Bore Cleaner	144	63%	(1611)	37%	(989)	100%	1877
	-						

исявек

Question 5a: Have cleaning rod (histograms for 5b-g available on request)

CONFILTNTIAL

1

MIG STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AS UF ZHEEDE

SSTANDARDC HLUCIO. NIG 1' MISIGGNAM DF CLCANING ROD CARRIED LOCATED IN WORDS ALIN ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTONS LUCATED IN WORDS.

NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all seven histograms on question 6s through \mathbf{g}_{\star}

	DO YOU CAR	DO YOU CARRY CLEANING HATERIALS ON OPPRATIONS?	S ON OPFRATIONS?	
ІТЕМ	INTERVAL 1 (NO. RESPONSE)	INTERVAL 2	TWERVAL 3	TOTAL HEN
		The same of the sa	7,00	KESPONDI NG
Cléaning Rod	126	85% (1614)	(182). 251	1002
LSA Lubricant	126	75% (1416)		•
Chambor Brush	126	70% (1332)	30% (563)	-
Bore Brush	126	70% (1334)		
Pipe Cleaners	127	36% (689)	259	1007 1894
Patches	126	71% (1348)	29% (546)	-
Bore Cleaner	. 161	34% (651)	64% (1209)	100% 1860
				•

Question 6a: Carry Gleaning Rod (histograms for 6b-g available on request)

CONFIBENTIA

INTERVAL TOTASATUVE

Light of the second sec

HIG STATESTICAL SUPREMENTS AS IN ZUPLINGO

37		SSTANDANDE NEDCELO, HT# 1 HISTOGRAM DF HOM CARRIED ATTH ASSUCIATED WETGHITHG FACTURS LUCATED IN MONDS ;	F HOW CARRIED	O. LOCATED IN WORDS	WORDS 44
3					
Ì	~				
4,10	~				
: :	~				
÷	~				
=	×				
7.	۲				
<u>:</u>	×	-	3	WHERE ARE CLEANING MATERIALS CA	TERIALS CA
÷	*				
=	×	•	I RTERVAL	PLACE	NUMBER
?	`				
3	*			•	
-	~			-	
1	-			No Response	867
=,	×		•	•	,
•	•		~	Ammunition Pouch	Š
; <u>;</u>	*				
	*		~	Cluaning Kit	487
÷	~	•			•
÷	<	•	~	Pockets	5.
3.5	-				:
	~		ب	In Pack	161
Ž,	. ب		,		5
=	Κ.		9	On Balt	643
į	•	~			•
2.	≺ :	₹:	^	Other	310
;	×	-			
÷	~				
ž,	Υ '	≺		•	
=	٧	Y	TOTAL	A1c	1100
3	≺	Y	2		

52 4.32

2,72

Kerrin

1001

PERCENTAGE

ARR I ED?

Question 6hi Where are cleaning materials carried?

CONFIDENTIAL

是一种是一种,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,

CONF. ENTIAL

SUMX OUTPUT -- VEHSTON HY
MIG STATISTICAL SUMMARTES AS OF 28FLB68

SSTANDANDC ULUCIO. NIB I HISTOGRAH OF NEW BUTFTR EQUIPPED LOCATED IN WORDS MITH ASSULIATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LUCATED IN WORDS . 0. 490 490

PERCENTAGE IS YOUR MIG EQUIPPED WINEW BUFFER? NUMBER 315 90/1 2021 RESPONSE No Yes TOTALS INTERVAL 2-99

167 847

1002

Question 7s: Presence of new buffer, and number

of weeks it has been installed.

YING THE STATE OF

INTERVAL

CONFI INTIA

MIG STATISTICAL SURHARIES AS OF ZHEFBAB

LOCATED IN WORDS CSTANDARD BLUCIO. MIR I HISTHURAM OF C.P.C. EUUIPPEO MITH ASSUCIALLD METGHTING FACTONS LUCATED IN MORDS . O.

32,

IS YOUR MI	6 EQUIPPED 1	IS YOUR MIG EQUIPPED WITH A CHROHED CHAMBER?	D CHAMBER?
INTERVAL	RESPONSE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
, 1 2-99	No Yes	1385 636	69% 31%
10.	TOTALS	2021	1007

Question 7b: Presence of chromed chamber, and number of weeks in possession.

CONFITNIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONT. DENTIAL

SUMM DUTPUT -- VERSION MA

DELOCIO: "HIP I HISTOGRAM OF TRACER ANNO CARRIED LOCATED IN WORDS ARELD MEIGHTING FACTORS LUCATED IN WORDS . 0.

NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all three histograms on question

ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION CARRIED ON OPERATIONS	TON CARRI	ED ON OPE	RATIONS
CHARACTERISTICS	BALL	TRACER	TOTAL
X (Ave. Number)	224.3	65.1	297.8
€(Std Dev)	145.2	87.0	180.7
			•

Question 9: Total rounds tracer carried (histograms for ball and total rounds available on request)

CON " DENTIAL

MIG STATISTICAL SURHARY AS UP 28FEB68

36,	
D LOCATED IN MORDS	
LOCATED	
AHHO	
5	Š
HISTOGRAM OF LUBRICATION OF ANHO	ORUS .
3	,
Ē	=
STOCKAN	FACTOR'S LUCATLU IN SORUS
Ξ	CIGKS
-	ž
SIN .	2
2	ž
12018 >	IATCO
STANDARDS	AITH ASSUCIATED WEIGHTIN
1353	Ę

	FAGE		-:				2	2)		;									1	· •				:	•
ONS	PERCENTAGE		1	237	777	•	100	(1922)		:				į					;		munit Clon	•		;	
E AMIUNITI	NUMBER		86	450	1472		0000	0707										:		, 40 mm	בממנוכשר זמנו מד ששותוודרומנו			:	-
DO YOU LUBRICATE AMMUNITION?	RESPONSE		No Response	Yes	S.					:				_				:							
8	INTERVAL R		No No	2			0.19400	200			•		•			: :			1	7	data tron 10.				
Ш	IMI				•		-	_		:		:	•			:		:			;			•	
			•						-	•	•	•		•				•			:			:	
**	* *							××	:	:		:				1			*				•	:	14301046
1230	23	2000	1020	036	006	2 3 3 4 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5	3 Z		0.9	0.00	2000	 210	0.54	2014	CX : 00 4	200	277	. N	1	XX 012	:		XXX 07.	מאא מה	-1

CONFIDENTIAL

62

ngan ang dinggan ang mga kang ang pangang pangang ang panganan ang pangan ang pangang ang pangang kang dinggan

CONFICENTIA

ì.

MIS STATISTICAL SUMMARY AS OF PIFEBAB

LOCATED IN WORDS GLIANDARIC BLUCLU, NT# I HISTUGRAM OF MAG. CLEAN. INST.
WITH ASSOCIATLU MEIGHTING FACTURS LUCATED IN WORDS,
4-10. NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all three histograms in question 11.

Į							-
	HA	S INSTRUCTION (ON CARE & CLEAN	HAS INSTRUCTION ON CARE & CLEANING BEEN RECEIVED?	ED?		
<u> </u>	INTERVAL	RESPONSE	M16	AMMUNITION	HAGAZINE	-	
<u> </u>							
		. 9.	(26) 29	; =	(751) 201 (171) 7		
	2-99	Yes	64% (1580)		90% (1439).		
	100	No Response	344	436	425.		-
	-				•		•
ا	TOTAL C.	Responding	1002 (1677)	1001 (1677) 1002 (1585) 1002	1002 (1596)		
_		Questioned	2021	2021	2021	1	į
<u> </u>	(Ave Time	X (Ave Time Since Inst.): 16.5 Weeks	16.5 Weeks	15.8 Weeks	15.9 Weeks		
	(Std Drv)		16.1 Weeks	16.2 Weeks	16.1 Weeks	ì	

NUMBER

Question, 11c)... Heaks since reculpt of magazine...cleaning..instruction (histograms for Mi6 and ammunition cleaning available

on request)

Confident

INTERVAL

COF" IDENTIAL

ALCOHOLD SANCTON SANCT

NUS STATISTICAL SUMMANIES AS OF 201 EUGO

LUCATED	
E TO LUCK	ŝ
LURE 10	kDS .
OF FA1	2 2 0
STUCKAM	LOCATE
=	FACTURS
T L	IGHT120
atucio,	WITH ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTURS LOCATED IN WORDS .
NUARUS	I ASSUC!
:35	=

IN WORDS . 40.

		NUMBER OF FAILURES TO LOCK	TO LOCK		_
	INTERVAL	NUMBER OF PAILURES	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE	
•		None	1142	58%	<u> </u>
:	. 2-6	1-5	519	26%	_
	7-11	. 01-9	. 125	. 62	
	12-88	Over 10	99	3%	
	89	No Response	44	ŧ.	
	90-100	Some - No Mumber Given	135	አ20	
	TOTAL	7	2021	100%	-

 \overline{X}_i (average) = 5.3 failures/men reporting failures σ_i' (atd dev) = 6.3 failures

(std dev) = 4.6 fallures

Question 12: Number of failures to lock.

INTERVAL

CONFIDENTIA

CONF. TENTIAL

The second secon

I ASSECIATIO WITH I I I I I I ASSECTION LOCATED IN WORDS 11,	EtGNIING FACIONS, LUCATED IN MORDS , 0, LUCATED IN MORDS , 0, LUCATED IN MORDS , 0, LUCATED IN MORDS	0, LOCATED IN MOHDS USED BOLT ASSIST? E NUMBER PERCENTANS 1000 527, 1007, 1007, 1100	FAMDANDS E							•
HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 93 92 93 92 93 92 93 92 93 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? LAMPERAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015 Question 13: Use of bolt assist	_	STO WEIGHTING FA	HISTOGHAM OF I		LOCATED			
HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? INTERVAL. RESPONSE NUMBER 1	HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 1000 Question 13: Use of bolt assist		'				1 .		•
HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 1	HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? LATERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	. * *	:			•		:	
INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 1	INTERVAL RESPONSE NAMBER 1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015 Question 13: Use of bolt assist	HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	3 ;			·	***************************************			•
HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No. 1000 TOTALS 2015 Question 13: Use of bolt assist	HAVE YOU USED BOLT ASSIST? 1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	< *							!
INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No. 1000 TOTALS 2015	INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015 Question 13: Use of bolt assist	INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER 1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	* *							
1 No. Response 93. 2 Yes 922 3 No. 1000 TOTALS 2015	1 No. Response 93. 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No. 1000 TOTALS 2015	XXX							
1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	1 No. Response 93 2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015 Question 13: Use of bolt assist	1 No. Response 93	: XX		7 APP-001/A1	3300034	MINIO	a co a cara visa		
1 No. Response 93 48% 3 No 1000 52% TOTALS 2015 (1922) Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	1 No Response 93 46% 3 No 1000 52% TOTALS 2015 1902 Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	1 No Response 93 - 48% 3 No 1000 52% TOTALS 2015 190% (1922)	XX		רמובעינור	NESE CIVE	NOTES	F ENCENTAGE		
1 No Response 93 48% 3 No 1000 52% TOTALS 2015 100% Question 13: Use of bolt assist,	1 No Response 93 48% 3 No 1000 52% TOTALS 2015 1100% Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	2. Yes 922 48% 3 No 1000 52% TOTALS 2015 1100% Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	< ×							
2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	2 Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	, A4	i .	•					
2. Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	2. Yes 922 3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	2. Yes 922 3 No 1000 	Y			No. Response	93	***************************************		
3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	3 No 1000 TOTALS 2015	TOTALS 2015	Y *			·	ć	807	•	
TOTALS 2015	TOTALS 2015 Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	TOTALS 2015	×		· ·	501 .	276			
TOTALS 2015	TOTALS 2015 Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	TOTALS 2015	XX,	,	m 	£	000 1	. 52%		
Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	TOTALS 2015	TOTALS 2015	((
Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	TOTALS 2015	TOTALS 2015	XX							ĺ
Question 13; Use of bolt assist.	Question 13; Use of bolt assist,	Question 13: Use of bolt assist,	X X X		101	VTS		2001	:	
Question 13; Use of bolt assist.	Question 13; Use of bolt assist,	Question 13: Use of bolt assist.	. ×					(1922)	•	
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	: xx -							
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:		***************************************						i
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	< ×				•		•	
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	YY /	:			•			
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	* * *				• .		•	
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	××							
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:								
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	XX	:	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		•	:		
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	X ;		•	•		•	•	
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	**							
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	77		:		: :		• • • •	
Question 13:	Question 13:	Question 13:	**			•			•	
tri uotisent	in uninescript in the section in the	in understand	7XX				f Lair seaf	;	•	٠
AXA	1. DAX	1. 24X 1. 123450709£	, XX	-	ne nh		T DOIC ASSA	ָּרָלָּ מַרָּלָּ	•	
The supplies the supplies the supplies to the	AI 1.51507492	1A1 1234202492	AX4 ::				:	: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	,	

HANDER HOLD BELLEVIE STANDER BELLEVIE STANDER STANDER STANDER STANDER STANDERS STAND

COL IDENTIAL

THE STREET STREET, STR

M4 20F F 15 6 B
E&
>>
Ħ
22
25
SUMM OUTPUT VEHSION
23
31¥ :

NSSOCIA NSSOCI	WITH ASSOCIATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LINCATED IN WORDS + 0+	(XXXX)	Ę	INTERVAL RESPONSE NUMBER PERCENTAGE	Nevor 106	(mag 40)	100 Always 434 46% x	89 No Response 1080 . x	TOTALS 2021 100% X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	X (average) = 68.9% of time it cleared problem x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	XXXX	KKK	Question 13: Percentage of the time that use of X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	X
---	--	--------	---	-------------------------------------	-----------	----------	----------------------	-------------------------	--	--	------	-----	---	---

Soling Albert Construction of the Construction of Construction

CON TOENTIAL

NIG SINTISTICAL SURMARIES AS NI ZUFEBGB

LOCATED IN WORDS ESTANDAND< BLUGIO: NIB 1 HISTOGRAM UF MAGAZINES CARRIED MITH ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LUCATED IN WORDS . 0,

ń

NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all throe histograms on quootkon 14.

NUMBER OF MACA		4 OPERATIONS		
CENTRAL TENDENCY	NAMEUVER BNS ALL OTHERS THEATER	ALL OTHERS	THEATER	
X (Average No. Carried)	16.6	11.3	14.0	
of Distribution	7.5	8.2	7.8	-

Question 14: Number of magezinance to magezinance of the contract of the contr

INTERVAL 17345010

CONTROL OF THE SOUND OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PR

REGEN

TO VARIABLE STREET AND STREET STREET OF THE STREET STREET STREET STREET STREET STREET

SURA UNITARI -- VINSTUR AS MIG STATISTICAL SURMARY AS UF 2015 EUGO

MERKIN

A STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE

NIG STATISTICAL SUMMARY AS UP ZUFFUGO

X (ave)	*********
!	*****
	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

XXXXXXXXX	**************************************
1	X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

PARTITURE OF A PROPERTY OF A P

LOCATED IN WORDS ESTANDARDC BLOCLO, NT# 1 HISTOGRAM OF MOST POUNDS FIRED HITH ASSUCTATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LOCATED IN WORDS , 0, 550

SUMX DUTPUT -- VERSION M4 --

NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all three histograms on question 17.

	:						
* COMBAT	THEATER	•	307.7		.344.7		
SINGLE DAY OF	ALL OTHERS		327.0		357.5		
EXPENDED IN A	MANEUVER BNS		293.3		334.2		
LARGEST NUMBER OF ROUNDS EXPENDED IN A SINGLE DAY OF COMBAT	CENTRAL TENDENCY		\vec{X} (Average No. Expended)		✓ (Standard Deviation	of Distribution)	
LARGEST NUMBER OF R	CENTRAL TENDENCY		\overline{X} (Average No. Expend	•	(Standard Deviation	of Distribution)	

язамій

in a single day of combat -- theater (histograms for maneuver bns & all others available on -- request) Question 17: Largest number of rounds expended

INTERVAL 125456749C123456749C123456749

702

ASTANDARDS BLOCIO. NIB I HISTOGRAM OF CAMD ISSUED WITH ASSUCIATED BEIGHTING FACTURS LOCATED IN WINDS , 10 0,

HIG STATISTICAL SUMHANIES AS UP ZOFEDON

LOCATED IN WORDS 51.

NOTE; This table is a consolidation of two histograms on question 18.

	MIG CARE & CLEANING INSTRUCTION CARD	CLEANING	INSTRUCTIO	N CARD	4. 4
INTERVAL	RESPONSE	WAS CAR	WAS CARD ISSUED?	IF ISSUE STILL	IF ISSUED, DO YOU STILL HAVE IT?
					-
	No Response	1	110	•	936
. ~	Yes	28%	(1112)	512	(241)
n	No	42%	(767)	267	(535)
	Responding	1007	(1909)	1007	(1082)
101	Questioned	2019	19	2018	8

Question 18a: Was instruction card issued? (histogram for presence of card available on request)

INTERVAL

MIG STATESTICAL SUMMARIES AS OF 28FFB68

GSTANDAKUC ULOCIO, WIM I HISTIGRAM OF TEST FIRING With assuciated hetgiithig facturs lucated in wunds , O,

LOCATED IN WORDS

IMTERVAL 1 2. 3	DOES YOUR UNIT TEST FIRE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONST VAL RESPONSE NUMBER PERCENT NO Response 110 _ YES 1576 833 NO 335 187	1NDIVIDUAL NUMBER 110 1576 335	PERCENTAGE B3% 18%
TOT	TOTALS	2021	100%

Question 19: Does your unit test fire individual weapons?

7.5

TO THE PARTY OF TH

WITH ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTURS LOCATED IN WURDS , O. 1220	IF TEST INTERVAL 1 2 2	TEIRING IS CONDUCTED, IS SCHEDULE None At. First Light Before Moving Out Daily Every Second Day Heekly	IS THE NUM	SCHEDULE? PERCENTAGE 737 737 12. 47 17.
*****	INTERVAI	FIRING IS SCHED SCHED None At. First L Before Mov Daily Every Seco	1S THERE NUMBER 1236 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	SCHEDULE? PERCENTAGE 737 17. 17. 17.
****	INTERVAL 1 2	FIRING IS SCHED SCHED None At.First L Before May Daily Every Seco	1S THERE NUMBER 1236 13 13 13 14 14 14	SCHEDULE? PERCENTAGE 737 12. 47 17.
*********	INTERVAL 1 - 1 - 3 - 3 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4	FIRING IS SCHED SCHED None At. First L Before May Daily Every Seco	1S THERE NUMBER 1236 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13	PERCENTAGE 737 12. 42.
<*************************************	INTERVAL 1. 1 - 2	SCHED SCHED None At First L Before May Daily Every Seco	1S THERE NUMBER 1236 12 13	PERCENTAGE 737 737 47 17 17
*************	INTERVAI	SCHED SCHED None At. First L Before May Daily Every Seco	1236 1236 1236 1236 13 14 14 14	PERCENTAGE 737 737 747 17 17 17
************	1NTERVAL 1 - 1	SCHEDULE None At. First Light Before Moving Out Daily Every Second Day Weekly	1236 1236 1236 1236 13 13	PERCENTAGE 737 17. 17. 47. 17.
<		None At. First Light Before Moving Out Daily Every Second Day	1236	737. 17. 47. 47. 17.
*****	1 1 1 1	None At. First Light Before Moving Out Daily Every Second Day Weekly	1236 . 13	737. 12. 47 47. 13.
****		None -At. First Light -Before Moving Out	1236	737. 12. 47. 47. 13.
*******		At First Light Before Moving Out Daily Every Second Day	73	12. 47. 47.
(*************		Before Maving Out Daily Every Second Day	73	47 47 11
*********	1 .	Daily Every Second Day	73	12
********		Daily Every Second Day Weekly	73	
***********	•	Every Second Day	14	12
******		Weekly	- 5	
225 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X		ATRICAL		
275 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X			,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	
225 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X		_Other	215	13%
255 X 500 X 470 X 420 X 425 X	01	No Response	133	- (
175 X X X X X X X			,	
x 04.				
	TOT	TOTALS	2021	1001
x nns		•		(1688)
. X . S. S.	:			
X X X			:	
× · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•	,		•
(×				
225 A G X				
< ×		: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :		:
1.0 x x x 1.1				
× ^				
	Question 20: I	If you test fire, what is the test firing schedule?	is the test	firing schedul
* *				
	;	:	1	:
	(•	•
)			n-2*4	

SUNK UULPUT -- VERSION HA

55 LOCATED IN WORDS

MIG RIFLE CLEANING FREQUENCY NUMBER 13 789 174 204 9/ 224 551 Every 2 Weeks Every 2d Day Every 3d Day No Response FREQUENCY SSTANDARDS BLUGIO; MIS I HISTOGRAH OF CLEANING OF MIC MIH ASSOCIATED HELIGHTING FACTURE LUCATED IN WORDS , 0, Weekly Da11y Never INTERVAL

PERCENTAGE

14%

KUHBER:

5%

54% 15% 12%

X (ave) = 20.4 times per month

(std dev) = 11.1 times per month

2004

TOTALS

Question 21: Rifle cleaning frequency.

INTERVAL 123001036

HERBY ESTEVER ENLERGE THE RESIDENCE OF THE SECOND S

MIG STATISTICAL SUMMARTIES AS OF 23FEBGS

ESTAINDANG ULUCIO, "ITA I HISTOCRAM OF MAGAZINE LUAD WITH ASSUCIATED MEIGHTING FACTUAS LOCATED IN MORDS , 0,

LOCATED IN WORDS

N.	NUMBER OF POUNDS LOADED IN MAGAZINES	OADED IN MAG	AZINES
INTERVAL	RESPONSE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
	No Response	136	1
16	15	18	12
. 17	91	10	21 .
18	17	69	25
19	18	1241	299
20	61	316	177
21	50	220	12%
	TOTALS	2010	1007

иливея

✓ (std dev) = 0.82 rounds (ave)

Question 22: Number of rounds loaded into magazines.

1NTERVAL 123420709612345070941234567096

AND SOUTH SO

SUMX DUTPUT -- VERSION H4 MIG STATISTICAL SUMMARY AS OF 20FEBGB

FILE STANDARD BLUCIO, NTF 2 HISTOGNAM OF ROUNDS FIRED/4ND +1 LOCATED IN WORDS WITH AS:OCIATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LOCATED IN WORDS , 0,

NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all three histograms on question 21.

				:	:			:	•	
	THEATER	67	(792)	(150) 22% (319).	(100) 13% (186)	(101)	(123.)	. 154	(1434)	1637
	THE		422	22%	13%	(63) 77	(133) 16%	t	1007	16
R MONTHS 1/	MANEUVER BNS	29	(190		(100)	(69)	(133)	20	(616) 1007	735
AST FOU	HANEU		302	24%	167	10%	212	1	1007	•
TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED W/IN LAST FOUR MONTHS L	ALL OTHERS	. 50	70E 7067	(169)	(98)	(38) 10%	(98)	84	(798)	402
UNDS FI	ALL	.1	512	212	112	22	12%	1	Z301	
TOTAL RC	ROUNDS	No Response	0-500	500-1000	1000-1500	1500-2000	Over 2000	No Response	Responding	Ouestfoned
	INTERVAL		2	· es	7	Ś	9	01	TOTALS:	
-				:					 	

HUMBER

\(\text{Auq} \) \(\te

Question 23: .Total number.of rounds fired within the last four_months__ail.others (histograms for manéuver bns and theater available on request)

A Control of the second of the

SUNX OUTPUT -- VENSION M4 MIN STATISTICAL SUMMANY AS DF 20FE068 --

39 ESTÂNDANCE DELOCIO, NIM S' HISTOGNAM OF FAILUNE IN EXTRACTOZ LOCATED IN NORDS Altin associated meighting factors located in Nords , 0, NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all three histograms on question. 24.

		FAILURES TO EXTRACT*	ACT*	-	
INTERVAL NO. OF FAILURES	S	MANEUVER BNS.	ALL OTHERS	THEATER	 -
	4	:	:		
None		56% (359)	73% (565)) 65% (924)	
		8% (50)	7% (53)	77 (103)	
2		. 97 (.58)	57(.42)_	(001)77	
۳		(90) 29	2% (19)	(55) 42	
. 4		4% (27)	37 (23).	, 4% (50)	
5		57(_31,	27. (16)	1	:
9		2% (10)	2% (13)	. 22. (, 23)	
Over 6		(67.) 711	(55) 29	82 (117)	• •
No Response		16	127	218	<u>. </u>
	-				
Respondents		1002 (644)	100% (775)	1007 (1419)	
Questioned	7	735	- 305	1637	
S Sor	菷	5.6 & 6.9 .	5.0 & 6.5	5.4 & 6.7	
men)	=	2.5 & 5.2	. 0 7 7 7 1		× 3

язакий

* All men with less than four months in Vietnam were excluded.

INTERVAL

Condition of the Condit

MIG STATISTICAL SUMHARIUS AS OF ZOTEUGO

00 CSTANDANDS DECISION HE TO HISTOCKAM OF STICKING IN CHAMBERE LOCATED IN WORDS HITE ASSUCIATED METGHTING FACTORS LOCATED IN MINUS . 0. NOTE: This table is a consolidation of all three histograms on question 25.

	DID ROUNDS STICK IN CHAMBER WHEN CHAMBERED FOR:	TICK IN	CHAMBER W	HEN CHA	IBERED FOR		
INTERVAL	RESPONSE	0-8 HOURS	OURS	9-16	9-16 HOURS	17-24	17-24 HOURS
	No Response	•	438	1	865	•	849
۰	Yes	13%	(206)	8%	(88)	12%	(141)
ю	Š	87%	(1376)	226	(1068)	88%	(1029)
* 5 14 50 5	Respondents	100%	(1582) 100%	1007	(1156) 100%	1007	(1170)
. 674 101	Questioned	2,	2020	20	2021	02	2019

(histograms for 9-16 hours and 17-24 hours available on request) Do rounds stick in the chamber when left for: 0-8 hours? Question 25s:

кумвек

AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

MIG SPAFISTICAL SUMMARIES AS UP 2016860

/-				•				
63,		٠	•					
MORDS	•						(name)	/ BINO
Ξ						ı	7	3
LOCATED		•		•			TE DECEMBER	ISTECT TO
ESTANDAND HUGIO, HITM I HISTOGRAM OF NO. INSPECTIONS/MO. LOCATED IN MORDS 63. Min associated Meighting Factor's Located in Muros . O.							- / Sometiment in the manner of the manner o	UNIT RIFLE INSPECTION FREQUENCY (INSPECTIONS/FIGHT)
CHTING				•		-		
HLUC10.						•		
33	4	×	×	×	*	×	×	~
ASA		~	×	=	×	×	×	×
35	3	71.	14	ž	5	ç	۲,	",

1	ä		_			-							• •
HONTH)	PERCENTAGE		21%	15%	2%	. 21% .	29	52	29	7 7	t	13%	100%
INSPECTIONS/	NUMBER	•	. 391	277	. 66	396	. 113	100	120	^	147	249	2021
UNIT RIFLE INSPECTION FREQUENCY (INSPECTIONS/MONTH)	RESPONSE		No Inspections Conducted	1/Month (Monthly)	2 or 3/Wonth .	4/Month (Weekly)	5-7/Month	8/Month (Twice Weekly)	9-27/Month	31-98/Wonth	No Response	Yes No Number Indicated	Totals
UNIT	INTERVAL		_	2	3-4	.v	6-8	6	10-28	32-99	89	100	TOT

KUMBER

X (ave freq. of insps)=5.6 inspections per month #8.0 inspections (std dev)

Question 26a: Frequency of unit rifle inspections.

INTERVAL

A POLICY OF THE PROPERTY OF TH

416 STATISTICAL SUMMANTES AS UP ZUFEBOB

SSTANDAN'S ULUCIO, HIB I HISTOGRAM OF WHU INSPECTS
AITH ASS. CLAIRD WEIGHTING FACTORS LOCATED IN WORDS , 0,

LOCATED IN WORDS

5	WIO CONDUCTS UNIT WEAPONS INSPECTIONS?	ONS INSPECTIO	ONS?
INTERVAL	RESPONSE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
•			
	No Response	803	1
~	Fire Team Ldr	79	72
е	Squad Ldr	297	24%
4	Platoon Sgt	362	30%
'n	Platoon Ldr	225	19%
9	Company Comdr	229	192
7	Other Supervisor	23	. 2%
TOT	Totals:	2018	100%

Question 26b: Wo inspects weapons?

INTERVAL

TVIENTALINOS

A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR

SUNK GUTPUT -- VERSIUN NA MIG STATISTICAL SUNNARIES AS OF 201 ENGE

57,	
LOCATCO IN WORDS	
NIM I HISTOGRAM OF MAC. AND AMMO INSP.	ö
. ARIO AM	808
OF MAC	N KO
STOCRAH	LOCATCE
=	FACTURS
N.	Clentine
חר סכ זמי	IATED W
45 FARDAADS BLOCIDA	WITH ASSUCIATED WEIGHTING FACTORS LOCATED IN WORDS .

ONDUCTED?	PERCENTAGE	61% 39%.	, 100Z (1341)
SPECTIONS C	NUMBER	670 818 523	.2011
ARE UNIT MAG & APPO INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED?	RESPONSE	No Response Yes No	TOTALS
ARE UNIT	INTERVAL	- a' e; 	TOT

MUMBER :

Question 26c: Are unit magazine and ammunition inspections conducted?

ERMIN STATES OF THE STATES OF

il kuldding merepalation of the commence of th

	7700	ASTANDANDE BLUCIO, MITH ASSOCIATLU NEEGHT	MT 1 HISTE	NIS 1 HISTUGHAN OF PERCENT OF TRACITIVE PACTORS LUCATED IN WORDS , 0,	5	LOCATED IN WORDS		
	22.22	3 M M M M M						
		× × ×	****	#3d	CENTAGE TRACER		HBAT	
2-11 1-107 424 347		, ,	:	INTERVAL	RESPONSE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE	
12-2 11-207 264 347. 347. 12-2 11-207 264 217	33;	•			No Response	758.		:
22-31 11-20% 264 21% X (eve) 22-31 21-30% 117 14% X (eve) 32-61 31-60% 88 7% X (eve) 42-51 41-50% 18-30% 14-20%		:	:-	2-11	1-102	424	34%.	1
22-51 21-307 177 147 X (ave) 32-41 31-402 88 77				12-21	11-20%	264	21%	
22-61 31-60% 88 77. (atd do		•		22-31	.21-307	177	271	
### ### ### ### ### ### ### #### #### ####		**************************************	:	. 32-41	31-40%	88	72.	
22-61. 51-607. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 71-802. 46 47. 72-81. 72		* K	:	42-51	41-502	182	271	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
### ### ### ### ### ### ### ### #### ####			Parliamentalistics of the processing on	52-61	51-60%			TOST TOST OF THE ONLY
72-81 71-110% 46 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%	127	: :	:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	62-71	61-70%	ý		
## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##	25. 2 36.		:	.72-81	71-80Z	. 97	: :	
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	9 K	× ×	-	82.91	81-902	; ;	*	
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	3			92-100	91-1007		27	and which the terminal states of the continuous and the state of the s
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	2.5	· ·	:		4	22	2.5	•
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	2 (:		TOT	87		1001	
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X			××				(1263)	
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	- <u></u>	:			v×:	:	;	
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	<u>::</u>	***			× ×			
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	<u>:</u>	: :	******	77 44 7 4 4 4 5 7 A 6 6 6 6 7 P. P.	: : : :			
X8 K	223	K K A	.: **:	-	XQuest		contage tracer	
XXX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	7	e ac	** **	. : :: ~*	; ;			
14345578961234967846123445123445678961234456789612345678961234567896123456789612345678961234567896123456789612345678961	¥.2	XXCX3991X 7 Z	XX XX	X29 X4				***
	MICHAL	143436789612343678	123456789	45074961234567	2	1456769612345	578961234567892	*

Francisco Park Printer British

The water of the second second

ISTANDANC ULUCIO. NIG I NISTUGHAM OF CLFANING MAG. - AMMU LOCATED IN WORDS . O. MIGHTING FACTOMS LOCATED IN WONDS , O.

MIG STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AS UF ZHELBOO

				1
MAGA	HAGAZINK & APPIUNITION CLEANING PREQUENCY	CLEANING FRE	QUENCY	_
IHTERVAL	RESPONSE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE	
	Navor	601	26	
. ~	Daily	189	. 162	
e —	Every 2d Day	19	5%	
4	Every 3d Day	92	87	
*^	Wnnkly	345	29%	
•	Every 2 Weeks	144	12%	
_	Monthly	238	202	
80	No Response	833		
2	TOTALS	2011	.2001	
	• .		(1178)	_

#10.3 times per month X (ave frequency)=8.0 times per month (std dev)

Question 28: Magazine & annunition cleaning frequency

是是一个人,他们是一个人,他们是一个人,他们是一个人,他们是一个人,他们是一个人,他们是一个人,他们是一个人,他们也是一个人,他们也是一个人,他们也是一个人的

MIG STATESTICAL SUMMARIES AS OF ZHEBGB

WEAP	WEAPON PREFERENCE	E .
WEAPON	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
M16 & XM177E1 M14 Ocher	1543 258 16	857 147 17
TOTALS	1817	100%

Question 29: What weapon do you prefer?

MIG STÅTISTICAL SUMMARIES AS UT 201-EBGB

SSIANDANDS BLUCIO, HTW I HISTOGRAM OF LIKES I

LOCATED IN WORDS 68.

T	•••											_
	PERCENTAGE	•	265	. 23%	. 87	13%	2%	27	2%		2001 .	,
1 10,131	NUMBER	497	1357	625	222	352	53	116	67	•	. 3271	_
	5	2002	0	0	0		. 11	2	0			=
2 1/ 2/ 01.1MN	7	1982	0		9	20	'n	7	ю			•
OUT THE MIG? 11/1		1748	s	17	82	85	15	67	20			
WHAT DO YOU LIKE ABOUT THE MIG? 1/ 2/	7	 1095	12	497	115	217	14	25	18			
XOU LIK		497	1340	110	61	29	80	6	8			
	KESPONSE	No Response	Light Weight	Heavy Firepower	Ease of Cleaning/Maintenance	Ease of Handling	Lethality	Accuracy	Reliability		TOTALS	
TATEBUAT	TUTENATE		2	m	4	'n	9	7	∞			

NUMBER

of all responses (an individual frequently listed several "likes"). A histogram was printed for each column and then responses totaled in this table. "Likes" were recorded from each questionnaire in a 5 column field to assure the recording

2/ "Maverick" or unusual "Likes" were recorded separately.

Question 30: What do you "like" about the Mi6? (Column 1)

in in the contract of the cont

Ę

A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH

SUNX UUTPUT -- VERSIUN H4

SSTANDARDS BLOGIO, Nº1# 1 HISTOGRAM UF DISLIKES 1 WITH ASSUCIATED MEIGHTHIG FACTURS LOCATED IN MORDS,

5 LOCATED IN MORDS

ō

	PERCENTAGE	,	24%	1	. 25%	2%	. 22	22	. 268	· 21 V	37.	1007
	TOTAL	1064	187	305	189	13	13	37	38	- m	. 26	2137
	- 5	2018	0	0	0	0	~	2	0	0	0	
67 1/ 2/	LIMN LIMN	2017		0	0	-	-	0		0	0	
r the Mi	NUNDER BY COLUMN	2009	٥	٥	n	9	0	-	5	0	٥	
KE ABOU	NUNB	1924	-	2	16	-	2	۶	52	7	9	
OU DISLI	 -	1064	175	303	170	80	6	29	242	-	20	
WHAT DO YOU DISLIKE ABOUT THE HI6? $1/2$	RESPONSE	No Response	Sensitive to Dirt or Abuse	I Dislike Nothing	Difficult to Clean	Inadequate Range	Poor Lethality	Inaccurate	. Poor Reliability	Poor Penetration	Magazine	TOTALS
	INTERVAL		8	3	. 7	5	9	7	80	6	10	

14

NUMBER

"Dislikes" were recorded from each questionnaire in a 5 column field to assure the recording of all responses (an individual frequently listed several "dislikes"). A histogram was of all responses (an individual frequently listed several "dislikes"), printed for each column and then responses totaled in this table. 1

2/ "Maverick" or unusual "Dislikes" were recorded separately.

Question 31: What do you "dislike" about the M16? (Column 1)

INTERVAL

1

MIG STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AS OF ZOFEGGO

SSTANDARDS GLUCIO, NTA 1 HISTOGRAM OF CONHENTS I

LOCATED IN WORDS

PERCENTAGE 1933 2020 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS Need 30 Round Magazine Need On Wpn Storage for Cleaning Materials Other or No Responsel/ Needs to be Belt Fed RESPONSE TOTALS INTERVAL

ZE:E ZEEE

867 2% 26

1/ "Maverick" or unusual "comments" were recorded separately.

100%

(87)

Question 32: Additional comments - column 1 (histograms, for columns 2 & 3 available on request)

INTERVAL 123756 1896

CONFIDENTIAL

XI. Matrix Plots

A series of matrix plots which permitted correlation of responses to two or more questionnaire items were prepared to support the analysis. Tables 1 through 16 (Section VIII) were developed from these plots. A listing of each matrix print-out prepared follows by subject area.

Reliability

- 1. Lubrication of ammunition vs failures to extract
- 2. Percent tracer vs failures to lock
- 3.a. Hours mechanical training (before Vietnam) vs failures to lock and extract
- b. Hours mechanical training (in Vietnam) vs failures to lock and extract
- c. Total hours mechanical training vs failures to lock and extract
- 4. Time since last trained on M16 vs failures to lock and extract
 - 5. M16 cleaning trends vs failures to lock and extract
- 6. Magazine and ammunition cleaning trends vs failures to .
 lock and extract
 - 7. Number of rounds expended within 4 months vs failures to extract

 <u>Supervision</u>
 - 1. M16 cleaning trends vs unit inspections of M16
- 2. Magazines and ammunition cleaning trends vs unit inspections of magazines and ammunition

CONFIDENTIAL

Training

- 1. Training received before arrival in Vietnam vs MOS
- 2. Training received <u>before</u> arrival in Vietnam vs months in Vietnam
- 3. Of those <u>not</u> receiving training before arrival in Vietnam ("Nc" answer on question 3A)

o de la compacta de l

- a. Theater source vs duty position
- b. Theater source vs MOS
- c. Theater source vs grade
- 4. Of those receiving training before arrival in Vietnam ("Yes" answer on question 3A)
- a. Duty position vs hours mechanical training before Vietnam
 - b. MOS vs hours mechanical training before Vietnam
 - c. Duty position vs hours range firing before Vietnam
 - d. MOS vs hours range firing before Vietnam
- e. Duty position vs hours tactical training before Vietnam
 - f. MOS vs hours tactical training before Vietnam
 - 5. Of those receiving training in Vietnam
- $\hbox{a. Duty position vs hours mechanical training in } \\ \\ \hbox{Vietnam}$

COMPORTED THE

UNCLASS!FIED

<u>erterrational establication in the experimental experimental established in the experimental properties of the experimental experiment</u>

- b. MOS vs hours mechanical training in Vietnam
- c. Duty position vs hours range firing in Vietnam
- d. MOS vs hours range firing in Vietnam
- e. Duty position vs hours tactical training in Vietnam
- f. MOS vs hours tactical training in Vietnam
- 6. Of those <u>not</u> receiving training either before arrival in Vietnam or in Vietnam

Major unit vs Duty Position

Cleaning Materials

Of those having cleaning materials ("Yes" answer on question 5a to g)


1. to 7. Men who carry materials (a-g) vs MOS

Zeroing

- 1. Zeroing history vs MOS
- 2. Zeroing history vs duty position
- 3. Zeroing history vs time in Vietnam
- 4. Zeroing history vs type of unit (maneuver battalion and other)

Ammunition Load

- 1. MOS vs ball ammunition load
- 2. MOS vs tracer ammunition load
- 3. NOS vs number of magazines carried
- 4. Type of unit (maneuver battalions and other) vs total ammunition load





UNCLASSIFIED

General Usage

- MOS vs percent of fire expended in fully automatic mode
- 2. MOS vs percent of automatic fire expended in short bursts
- 3. MOS vs largest number of rounds fired within 1 day of combat
 - 4. MOS vs percent tracer used
 - 5. Duty position vs percent tracer used
 - 6. Weapon preference vs MOS
 - Test firing vs duty position
 - 8. Test firing vs type of unit (maneuver battalion and other)

Major unit

- 1. Major unit vs presence of new buffer
- 2. Major unit vs zeroing history
- 3. Major unit vs lubrication of ammunition
- 4. Major unit vs test firing
- 5. Major unit vs M16 cleaning trends
- 6. Major unit vs unit inspections of M16
- 7. Major unit vs magazine and ammunition cleaning trends
- 8. Major unit vs unit inspection of magazines and ammunition
- 9. Major unit vs percent tracer
- 10. Major unit vs failures to lock and extract
- 11. Major unit vs training received in Vietnam

HINCI ACCIEIED

